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Society's Overuse of 'State Secret' Label in Media Satirized

18300327 Novosibirsk *EKONOMIKA I ORGANIZATSIYA PROMYSHLENNOGO PROIZVODSTVA* in Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 132-141

[Article by Anatoliy Agranovskiy: "Absolutely Not Secret"]

[Text] There was a case: A small letter came to a newspaper. Reading it, I at first was angry, then I laughed, and then I nevertheless fell to thinking. What journalism is still needed here?! You will only make a helpless gesture. . . .

Dear Editors! Without knowing this yourselves, you have put me in an awkward position. The point is that, being a lecturer on politics, I frequently use press materials. During a regular discussion, I read the feuilleton in IZVESTIYA, for which I received a severe reprimand from the leadership. I was told that it should not be read among workers, since one can see in it allusions to our local affairs. But here, you see, is the trouble: You did not indicate in your columns which articles are secret, and which are not, what one can read aloud, and what—for oneself. I ask you for counsel, how I am to conduct myself in such cases in the future. . . .

M. Girich, engineer
Leninogorsk

We checked—everything is exact. This was in the workshops of the staff for mine-rescue work in Eastern Kazakhstan. The head of the staff smelled out the allusion and ordered to put a stop to it, after which a discussion was held with the engineer about the harmfulness of reading newspapers. He said, what right did he have to divulge absolutely secret material published in an edition of more than 7 million copies. . . .

The case, I will say openly, is a rare one and, together, there is a kind of naive, reader simplicity in it. The question in the feuilleton involved not the affairs of Kazakhstan, but wholly even Ukrainian affairs. The story of a certain high-handed director, his crudeness and his stupid willfulness. There was already a report that he was removed from the post, the matter was closed, and suddenly at the other end of the world—it was recalled. Another comrade, unknown to the newspaper, not named by the newspaper, took the blow.

He hurried, got angry, but to no purpose. He would sit and wait, perhaps his turn would not come, but he himself counted himself as belonging to the clan of the people being criticized. Remember, Nozdrev, having showed Chichikov the boundary of his estate, said that all the land on this side, and also on that side, was his! . . . All the criticism, both from that side, and from this side belongs to the chief of staff from Kazakhstan, he has already signed for it. And here we completely trust him: One would think, he knows precisely himself.

Somehow matches fell into my hands with the label: "Save the forest from fires!" A good appeal, but it is not addressed to me. Since I don't make campfires and I am not carried away by hunting. And when I am writing my articles, I do not appeal to all the readers to save the forest that is drowning in the rivers, I do not call for the healing of eye diseases, the carrying out of reconstruction, etc. Journalism cannot limit itself to the solution of concrete tasks, even the most important ones.

We cannot support every single inventor, tell about all new construction projects, celebrate all records, as we do not have the manpower to expose all careerists, drunkards, and bribe-takers. A newspaper or journal is a mirror, look at yourself, recognize yourself. And if you undertook some noble deed, then, reading about another good initiative, know: This is also for you. If your deeds are, pardon me, unsightly, then again the feuilleton, the critical signal, whatever their address, were written for you.

A fool will not understand. He sits in the hall, watches a satire on himself, and laughs: The name and patronymic are other ones. Thus, it is not about him. The clever man will understand, but will not give a sign. He will even move his hands for applause. In what way is our case unique? The man learned to recognize himself, but he did not consider it necessary to give a sign.

A small excursion into the history of literature. Already, Victor Hugo, drawing a portrait of a certain scoundrel in "Les Miserables," entered a reservation: ". . . the word 'innkeeper' we use here in a limited sense, and it does not stretch to this entire estate as a whole." The de Goncourt brothers reproached him: "The author is afraid to offend even Messrs. the inkeepers." And how many such reservations have there been since that time, and as yet they have not helped anyone; in our writings the words "bureaucrat," "bungler," as well as, on the other hand, the words "innovator" and "front-rank worker" offend and should offend, or, on the contrary, glorify and should glorify all of these estates as a whole.

It turns out, the chief of staff from Eastern Kazakhstan read the feuilleton precisely as it should be read. Another thing is interesting: Having understood absolutely everything and having applied everything to himself, he nevertheless did not become frightened, he was not confused. Give such "mine rescuers" the freedom, they will tear the newspaper from the street stands, will prohibit an issue of a journal from being given out in the library, and will not release "Fitil" on the screen in their city—here there is no artistic exaggeration, such cases have been described and are known. This very prohibitiveness, which is contrary to our Soviet laws, and this very anything but timid propensity to declare secret what is objectionable to them—this is, to be honest, what worries me most of all.

A sekretnik is a lover of secrets of any sort. In the dictionary of V. I. Dal' this word is cited, and, perhaps, a more accurate one cannot be found—sekretnik. What is the logic of his actions?

I remember, a powerful GRES, a thermal coal-fired station, was built in the east of the country. They built it for a long time, for many years, and for all of these years it was outside criticism. They were silent about it when the undertaking did not go well, when an open and frank discussion of the shortcomings was especially important. Then they completed the GRES successfully, and a report appeared in the newspapers, and, consequently, they removed the GRES from the secret list—precisely when all the difficulties had been left behind. Why did they "cover it up"? Why did they "open it up"? What changed during this period of time? Why, nothing. And no state interest was involved in this. But there was an exclusively departmental interest—to remain outside criticism, outside public control.

I traveled with planners of Giprostank (State Planning Institute for the Planning of the Machine Tool, Tool and Abrasives Plants and Forging-and-Pressing Machinery Plants) to select sites for a new plant. We arrived in a certain town, I wanted to find out how many people lived there, and I was told: It is not allowed. That is, they named the figure in the City Planning Commission, but they added that it should not be "divulged." Why? Because it is not recommended. But a whole statistical collection has been published, in which the size of all localities is indicated black on white, where the inhabitants number more than 100,000. True, they answer, but they have less than 100,000. Hm. . . . In the evening in the hotel, my companions laughed at me.

However, soon came my turn to enjoy myself. In the Oblast Planning Office, they refused to give out to one of them, Yaroslav Vasilyevich Lavrov, the land-surveying plan of Goncharki—the outskirts of a city settlement. That is, they did give it to him, but only after he had collected all the necessary visa. And on the plan we saw two and a half horizontals, three streets and four dozen little houses with kitchen-gardens. "The main thing is to confuse the adversary," said Lavrov. "But we become confused myself. . . ."

"You forget," said the strict comrade from the Oblast Planning Office, "that not far away from it an elevator is being built."

"Carry on!" Lavrov allowed. "Hide it in your pocket. Such a bandura stands, thirty meters. And directly at the railway. And thousands of passengers see it every day!"

Then we traveled on the train, went through tunnels, the car was plunged into darkness, emerged in God's light, and again into the darkness, and once again. . . . The conductor walked by.

"How many tunnels are there here?" I asked.

"I cannot say. I am not supposed to."

And next to me stood a boy:

"Uncle, I counted: Seven."

These are all obvious absurdities, but here are more complicated ones for you. In the end, my companions selected a site and undertook to "put" their plant on it—in a small, wormwood, dusty little town, for the time being far from industrial development. The plant was called Tsentropolit; the essence of the scheme was to organize on a cooperative basis the production of castings, to deliver the entire kray from small, ineffective plants. And here it suddenly turned out that they are building a Diesel giant in this town and near it—a diminutive foundry. A clear case, I decided to get involved in a fight, but the planners, experienced people, told me not to poke my nose in: The project is "closed." By the way, on the first day when we arrived there, the manager of the hotel, having recognized in us people who were sent on a mission, asked: "You are not going to the Diesel? They have a cozy, in-house telephone; one is not allowed to remember the numbers. You boldly pick up the receiver, ask for the Diesel plant, and they ask you only: "The office of Kopayev or Verkhoturtsev?"—and connect you. The bus driver will not forget to announce: "Next stop—the Diesel plant!" There are taxicabs in the town, around two dozen vehicles; you get in the first one of them, name the same address—and they will take you there. If you don't catch a taxi, you can get there on foot—any boy will show you the way. Or—any militiaman.

Is it possible that all of them, from small to big, show outrageous unconcern? . . . I called the Diesel by phone, asked a militiaman for directions, did not wait for the bus, took a taxi and went to the plant. It was pouring rain, the builders were all hiding somewhere, nobody was working anywhere. From the outside, the shops appeared to be shops, inside—enormous unfinished barns. The roof leaked, water trickled on the walls and collected in pools on the cement floor.

Kopayev, the director of this "unfinished state of affairs," told me the sad story. The construction unfolded already 8 years before our arrival. The buildings that I saw were erected during the first year and a half. Since that time, the Diesel plant, essentially, has been marking time. It has not yielded a kopeck's worth of production, and already 312,000 rubles have been spent for its repair. Thousands are flying for maintenance, for the support of the staff, and finally the following column also appeared—for theft: Not long ago, someone walked off with the slate from the roof and ripped the window frames out of the walls.

But what an absurdity! Is it possible that people who are honest and not afraid to voice criticism do not see this? It goes without saying, they do see it, but they cannot voice criticism. To express indignation, having met a

friend in the street—perhaps. But to take the floor at a session of the City Soviet—not in any case. As the project, so the criticism: Closed. . . .

"This, you understand, is the situation," Kopayev told me. "I cannot give you anything. Whatever document you pick up, there is a stamp on it. Whatever small scrap of paper you take, it has a signature stamp. . . . Of course, we have outrages in our country, they take place. But one should be patient."

"We 'were patient' for 8 years. That's enough."

"How can I make you understand?" he sighed. "They decide. . . . Upstairs they decide, is that clear? . . . In short, there is the view. . . . And in such a matter it does not pay to take a wrong step. You know yourself: Vigilance!"

Here we have to say after careful consideration, responsibly and seriously: Modesty is needed in the present-day world. Moreover, it is extremely important there, where it is really needed. There have always been, there are, and there will be state secrets as long as states exist on earth. All the more so the states of two systems. There are various types of secrets—military, scientific, technical, and commercial—not introduced by us. And the workers responsible for this sphere are carrying out a task of enormous importance and difficulty. They are carrying it out professionally and intelligently. And we are able to keep secrets, when necessary. There is a multitude of examples. I will cite only the one which everybody remembers.

Not individuals, but tens of thousands of people—designers, scientists, workers, electronics specialists, chemists, and builders—took part in our rocket and space program. It is a well-known fact: The strength of any chain is determined by its weakest link. But no such links were found, and our first ballistic missile, the launching of sputnik, and the flight of Yuriy Gagarin came as a complete surprise for the world. Such was the measure of responsibility of all participants of the undertaking.

Being at experimental plants, in design bureaus, laboratories, and test airfields, I comprehended a long time ago how strictly they were able to differentiate what "one may" from what "is prohibited." I myself would warn that I will—such is my work—ask any questions, and let them cut me short, if I prove to be tactless—such is their work—I won't be offended at all.

They conducted themselves differently. Andrey Nikolaevich Tupolev, in the manner of an old man, went over "to the familiar thou" and looked at me keenly over his glasses: "You don't say. You leave this". . . . Artem Ivanovich Mikoyan kept silent, hemmed, and, as for lashing out, he didn't, but he grew awkward. Semen Alekseyevich Lavochkin, on the other hand, himself, as it were, felt the awkwardness, pretended something and

said: "We will return to this. . . in 3 years or so." Aleksey Mikhaylovich Isayev was a boisterous and lively person, we had known each other some 18 years, and as I asked too much about his "small engines" for space, he laughed heartily and changed the conversation to the children and new films, of which he is a great lover. The test pilot Mark Lazarevich Gallay, when they asked him in company, for example, what speed he attained in the most modern fighter plane, he told the meeting with killing seriousness the precise (completely unthinkable) figure: Eighteen thousand two hundred thirty two and a half kilometers per hour!"

The manner differed, but the essence was the same: These people, both at work and at home, clearly remembered the boundary of the permissible. Professionals in the keeping of secrets, they knew as well that everyone of them must be unshakeable: That which is secret today will become known to all tomorrow. They knew precisely when; as they say in children's games, "It is not time," and when not only "it is time," but there is a need, a necessity, from the point of view of the state, to inform the people and all of humanity about the new success, which was done—in its time or a little bit later.

Thus, in my sketches I am not talking about genuine secrets of the country, which require the most vigilant protection, but about imaginary secrets that are waiting impatiently for the resolution: "Absolutely not secret."

Silence has never benefited a single department. What did the director of the Diesel "unfinished construction" attain in practice? He attained what our mine rescuer dreamed about—impunity. But, you see, there was nothing in his sly pauses and in the skillful reservations. And it is not a secret of the managers of the plant, but a disgrace that they have frozen 55 million rubles at the construction site.

Having returned to Moscow, I nevertheless went to the ministry to which the plant belonged. Perhaps, there was here, indeed, some reason not known to the local comrades? It turned out not to be so. Very ordinary Diesel motors will be produced. Simply ages ago, still before the time of the sovnarkhozes, someone applied the signature stamp to the project—and off you go. Several five-year plans passed, the production being turned out changed, the owners of the plant changed, from the sovnarkhozes they transferred it to one ministry, then to another—everything passed by, everything changed, and only the all-powerful stamp remained in place.

(Soon, after the intervention of people who are quite competent, they removed him, and criticism was heard in the press, including mine; the diminutive shop was struck from the plan, and the plant was put into operation, but that is not what we are talking about here.)

"Of course," they agreed with me in the ministry, "there is nothing to hide in the Diesel now. You have a look, and we would feel more at ease."

"Why was it 'closed'?"

"Because it was not open. . . ."

This is the whole logic, and there is no other here. You don't spoil kasha with butter, and you don't do any harm to an undertaking with secrecy—this is how many still reason. If something is "filtered," this is clear to everyone, there is sure to be a loss. But no one has as yet been condemned for overcautiousness. In everyday terms, this logic, alas, is justified. Conclusion: Better I add a hundred unnecessary stamps than that I omit even one that is really necessary.

Meanwhile the time has come to understand that secrecy, even when it is extremely necessary, is not the joy of life, but a sad necessity. In two plants people are struggling with the same problem, not having the right to consult with one another; a certain institute develops a method that long ago was rejected as defective in another one; three expeditions leave from different places to meet in the valley of a river for the prospecting of the same mineral deposit—all of this is called parallelism in work and costs us many millions.

Pseudo-secrecy is uneconomical. It hampers scientific-technical progress, and this is already a question of the future of the country. We cannot today in every industry re-invent the bicycle, a more rapid exchange and cross-flow of technologies. It goes without saying, in so doing patent protection must be secured, but, you see, even it is hindered by the "lovers of all sorts of secrecy." Abroad they are extremely tenacious for the time being in concealing findings and sketches, and there is industrial espionage, favor-seeking, and bribery. But there it is understandable. There they have competition, superprofits, wolf-like laws, and other such things. But why should we do the same thing? Conceal from a neighboring enterprise, from ourselves?

In the party decisions the task has been set in precise terms: The defense industries must increase their contribution to the national economy. The state has the right to count on the fact that everything valuable—whether it is invented in a food institute or in a nuclear one—will yield the greatest effect in the dimensions of the country. Teflon, as is well known, was invented for rockets, but proved to be the best cover for frying-pans. But this, you see, is difficult work, "unnecessary" troubles, and if someone avoids them it is the simplest thing to escape under the shadow of secrecy—and then it is not necessary to turn over the sketches, and introduction is not required.

Or, let us assume, your dissertation is weak, the reviews are bad, and the defense is doubtful. Again, cover it with a signature stamp, and your opponents will fall silent. What is convenient here? The burden of proof is not on the person who puts this stamp, but on the person who wants to remove it. And there should be, to the contrary, the presumption of non-secrecy. How much has been

written on the departmental barriers that hinder specialization and cooperation. But if alongside the barriers the same signature stamps are added, then you don't pierce through at all here. The lovers of secrecy erect a blind wall, behind which one can lead a quiet life.

It turns out that they are not at all harmless. And they are equally as harmful as their attempts (futile) to conceal a central newspaper from the readers of their village, as their attempts (also vain) to hide from all what is known to all. Let us nevertheless not classify as secret the fact that our atmosphere contains 78 percent of nitrogen. We will not conceal that the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea. And that horses, wherever they have survived, eat oats. Pseudo-secrecy, above all, harms genuine secrecy.

I talked with many comrades about the "secrets" of the Diesel plant, and I did not encounter a single one who approached it seriously, who did not chuckle, who did not swear, and who did not start to answer my questions. People talked about things that were formally considered "closed," people got used to talking about them—is this not the breeding of unconcern?

You live in ignorance in a twofold way:

First of all, you don't know anything,
And, secondly, you don't know
That you . . . don't know anything.

A most ancient epigram, it is 200 years old, the author is N. M. Karamzin. You don't know that you . . . don't know anything. We need today for the mass of the toilers to know as much as possible, for them to be involved in planning, for them to take part in the people's control, for them to direct the struggle for quality and efficiency of work.

The party demands that discussion with them be open, well-argued, and serious, that propaganda be conducted in an aggressive spirit, and that information be all-embracing and energetic. And here it is difficult to even approximately take into consideration all of the losses being inflicted by the fanciers of playing hide-and-seek, who arbitrarily, in the entrails of their department, frequently in spite of direct instructions from above, stick on the signet "secret" even where it might not be at all.

These are the reflections to which I was led by chance or, to put it better, by the curious incident from which it all began. We will speak frankly: In order to punish one bureaucrat it is not at all obligatory to draw a picture of him for the entire Soviet Union. One reasoned memorandum would be sufficient. Thus—the subject for a small order. Why the editions of journals and newspapers running into the millions? For the very reason that others should find out and that all be reached.

Journalism invariably goes beyond the boundaries of a particular case, it goes further, digs deeper, and awakens the thought of the people. For this reason, the savage reaction to the feuilleton of the fancier of secrecy from

Eastern Kazakhstan made me happy. May we always have such hit accuracy. The man himself, as they say, by his own initiative, "generalized" himself.

My article had one goal: To make his story a fact of the public consciousness. To help the people to approach it without fear. To portray similar curious incidents beyond the limits of such armchair discussions. And only?

Yes, in essence. To know everything ahead of time and to explain everything in detail is difficult. In Balzac there is a story, "The Secrets of the Princess de Cadignan." "And this is the denouement?" he asks at the end. And he answers: "Yes, for intelligent people. But not for all who want to know everything."

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Career, Achievements of Zinovyev Summarized
18300343 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by I. Lisochnik: "A Revolutionary, a Theoretician, a Journalist" under the "History without Retouching" rubric; first four paragraphs are a boldface introduction]

[Text] As first reported by IZVESTIYA, on June 13 the plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court overturned the verdicts in the trials of Zinovyev-Kamenev, Pyatakov-Radek and their codefendants. Thus an event occurred which we have long discussed among ourselves and, given past rehabilitations, have wondered whether or not it would happen.

It should be mentioned that many people had misgivings upon learning the news. This is not surprising. Two full generations have been raised on cliches from Stalin's "Short History" such as "trotskist-zinovyevian gang" and duplicitous operators who tried to turn the communist party into a party of capitalist restoration. For a long time, the name Zinovyev has been synonymous with treason and dirty political machinations.

But if today, having learned that neither Zinovyev nor his supporters were in any way guilty before the law, the country or the people, you wished to find out the truth about the man, you would inevitably encounter difficulties. There are few other individuals whose memory was as thoroughly eradicated as Zinovyev's. Articles about him were even ripped out of encyclopedias and reference books, and in some cases replaced by newer pieces based on the views of the 1930's. It is extremely difficult to find any original sources.

For this reason, it is necessary to summarize at least the main milestones of Zinovyev's life. I am not a historian and, naturally, I would not try to pass judgement on his political activities or to assess his achievements and mistakes. That will probably be soon done by specialists, those who use methods of historical analysis. For now, here are the milestones.

Grigoriy Evseyevich Zinovyev (1883-1936) was a follower, a companion and a confederate of V.I.Lenin, a professional revolutionary and an outstanding leader of the party and the state. His activity is in a large part closely tied to this city.

He was born in Elisavetgrad, into the family of a small milk farmer. He went to work at the age of 14, helping his family out of his wages; he tutored privately and later worked as a clerk.

In the late 1890's, he began to study marxism at self-education classes and joined a group that was organizing early economic strikes in the south of Russia. Starting in

1901 he was persecuted for his political beliefs and the following year he went abroad—to Berlin, Paris and Bern—where he took part in the work of social democratic groups.

In 1903, in Switzerland Zinovyev met Lenin and Plekhanov. At the 2nd Party Congress, when the party split, he decisively sided with the bolsheviks; he then returned to Russia, where he worked underground in groups associated with ISKRA.

In 1904-1906 he suffered from heart disease, twice falling gravely ill. On two occasions, he traveled abroad and studied at the Bern University. At the same time, he continued his political work and contributed to the magazine VPERED. He came back to St.Petersburg during a general strike but then returned to Bern once again.

In 1906 he moved back to St. Petersburg. He worked in a workers' suburb beyond the Moscow Gate, becoming one of the most popular propagandists and earning a nickname Grigoriy Moskovskiy, and was elected to the city's party committee, the bolsheviks' mainstay and their principle organization.

Soon, Grigoriy Moskovskiy was attacking the kadets and mensheviks in speeches around the city, editing, together with Bogdanov, a highly popular underground bolshevik organ VPERED and contributing to underground publications; he also joined the executive commission of the city party committee.

His life in those years was typical for an underground professional revolutionary: it was saturated with secret work, public meetings, strikes and demonstrations and went on under the constant threat of arrest. As a noted Bolshevik in the proletarian St.Petersburg, Zinovyev actively participated in the election campaign to the 2nd Duma and in the campaign to choose delegates to the party congress in London.

In 1907 in London, at the 5th Congress, where he came as a delegate from St.Petersburg, he was one of the six bolsheviks elected to the Central Committee and became a member of the so-called Bolshevik Center. From then on, he remained a steady member of various versions of the Central Committee.

Immediately following the London congress he returned to St.Petersburg and, still underground, became an editor of the party's underground central organ SOTSIAL-DEMOCRAT. In the spring of 1908 he was arrested by the secret police and spent several months in prison.

At the end of that summer, by the decision of the Central Committee, Zinovyev was sent abroad, to Geneva, where V.I.Lenin was living then; Zinovyev became one of Lenin's closest associates and wrote articles for various publications on the theory and practice of the

workers' movement. He attended the All-Russian Party Conference in Paris and spoke at the Prague conference which marked the beginning of the independent Bolshevik party.

Soon after the Prague conference Lenin moved to Poland, to Krakow, in order to be closer to Russia. Zinovyev followed, participating in the work of the Central Committee bureau and meeting and conferring with visitors from Russia.

The start of World War I found them there. With great difficulties, Lenin and Zinovyev traveled via Vienna to Switzerland, where they re-established the party's central organ SOTSIAL-DEMOCRAT. Together with Lenin, Zinovyev was the party's representative at the Zimmerwald Conference; there, he formed the Zimmerwald Left and became a member of its bureau.

The February Revolution found Lenin and Zinovyev in Bern. An opportunity to return to Russia opened only a month later. Lenin, together with a group of bolsheviks which included Zinovyev, traveled across Germany and Sweden to the motherland. These events are well-known and in the German Democratic Republic there is a museum in a railway car, which recreates the history of that journey.

The Petrograd proletariat enthusiastically greeted the return of Lenin and his comrades. The party and broad popular masses had to be readied for the October Revolution. Zinovyev became chairman of the all-city conference of the Petrograd organization and joined PRAVDA's editorial board; he remained a co-editor until the paper was shut down in July.

Fierce and dangerous political struggle was under way. The enemies of the bolsheviks were spreading lies about a sealed car, disseminating counterfeit papers designed to prove that Zinovyev, together with Lenin, was spying for Germany. The Central Committee ordered Lenin and Zinovyev to go underground.

At first, Zinovyev was hiding out in Petrograd, but on July 9 he and Lenin went to Razliv, where they stayed on the property of a Sestroretsk Plant worker Yemelyanov, living in a hut in a grass field. In early August, Zinovyev returned to Petrograd, hiding out in the apartment of a worker Kalske until October events.

The authoritative Granat Encyclopedia reports: "Long before the February Revolution, Lenin, in close collaboration with Z., worked out a plan of bolshevik actions for a period of transition from the bourgeois democratic dictatorship to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Two key works, 'Several Theses' in 1915 and 'An Outline for the March 15 Theses,' were written by Lenin with the extremely close participation of Z." On October 10, Zinovyev was elected a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which was formed to lead the uprising.

And here, Lenin's disciple committed a series of severe, extremely grave errors by opposing not only his teacher but the majority of the Central Committee. On October 16, Zinovyev and Kamenev tried to get the uprising postponed for reasons of "insufficient preparedness"; unable to get enough support, they took an extraordinary step of publishing in the newspaper "NOVAYA ZHIZN" a declaration denouncing the uprising an adventurist step, thereby effectively betraying the party's highly secret plans to Rodzyanka and Kerenskiy.

On October 17, Zinovyev, as well as Kamenev, Nogin, Rykov, Milyutin and others, resigned from the Central Committee demanding the formation of a "government that would include all the parties of the soviets." According to John Reed, "...the response of Lenin's faction was fast and decisive. Shlyapnikov and Teodorovich complied with party discipline and returned to their posts, Kamenev was stripped of the presidency of the TsIK and replaced by Sverdlov and Zinovyev was forced to resign as Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet."

These events, which incidentally were concealed in many biographies of Zinovyev published while he was alive, were later described in literature in great detail, but tendentiously. Lenin's unquestionably just condemnation of the "ultimatum of the intelligentsia group" and accusations of "desertion and strike-breaking" that he threw at them, were used to brand Zinovyev and others as deliberate enemies. Yet, to Lenin they were like-minded people (subsequently, he used the word like-minded in relation to Zinovyev quite frequently). He was uncompromising in fighting like-minded people's mistakes, but also in defending the people themselves.

Zinovyev's subsequent life is proof to that. In November 1917 he worked in Petrograd and in the Ukraine. On December 13 he once again assumed the post of Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. In January 1918, he became the head of the Committee for Revolutionary Defense of Petrograd, and in February, of the Sovnarkom of the Petrograd Working People's Commune. On April 26, he became the head of the Sovnarkom of North Region communes.

While continuing his work in this country, Zinovyev, on Lenin's request, was gathering survivors of the Zimmerwald Left all over Europe, and in 1919, at the 1st Congress of the Communist International, he was elected Chairman of the Comintern's Executive Committee. This post, like that of Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, would be his very important duty for many years thereafter.

All this was happening at a time when struggle for leadership was starting inside the party, even while Lenin was still alive. Four individuals could realistically aspire to gain the upper hand: Trotsky, Stalin, Zinovyev and Bukharin. It would probably be incorrect to claim that they all were power-hungry. They were different people and their motives were also dissimilar.

Undoubtedly, two of them—Trotsky and Stalin—wanted personal, autocratic power. The former did so openly since he thought of everyone around him as mediocrities; the latter covertly, carefully selecting temporary allies while, as the head of party organization, tightly controlling all the threads of party structure. As to Zinovyev and Bukharin, their quest for power stemmed from their ideological convictions. They were not only revolutionaries in practice, but extremely important party theoreticians as well.

The debate on trade unions and the 10th Party Congress effectively knocked Trotsky out of the race for party leadership. His subsequent attempts to form an opposition only led to his expulsion from the country in 1929. Incidentally, the theses "On the Role of Trade Unions," adopted by the 10th Congress, were written by Zinovyev.

After the ideological defeat of trotskism, Zinovyev emerged as one of the leading figures in the party. Today, it is difficult to understand the true extent of his authority and influence on the life of the nation. In Leningrad, there was the Communist University imeni Zinovyev, large editions of his works were being published and postcards and wall calendars with his portrait were being issued.

There are reliable facts corroborating his importance in the party during that time. Zinovyev delivered the political report of the Central Committee at the 12th Party Congress, the first congress which Lenin did not attend due to illness, and at the 13th Congress, the first after Lenin's death.

The 14th Congress was dramatic for Zinovyev. Some people believe that at that congress he criticized Stalin's line. Strictly speaking, this was not exactly so. Stalin's line was still concealed, and there was no high praise for him either. On the other hand, some features of the glorification of Stalin as a leader had already started to emerge and were noted in a speech by Kamenev: "We are against developing a theory of a leader. We are against creating a leader... I have become convinced that Comrade Stalin should not stay on as the coordinator of the bolshevik staff."

At the congress, Stalin presented the political report of the Central Committee. His closest ally was Bukharin. Actually, it was Bukharin, his ideas and positions that Zinovyev was fighting against. The two men disagreed on many things: on NEP, on state capitalism, on the economic stratification of the village and the role of the kulaks, on collective leadership in the party, etc.

Apparently, Zinovyev considered Bukharin a much more dangerous rival than Stalin, which was clearly shown in his speech. But, objectively speaking, he was more or less diametrically opposed to Stalin's ideas as well. This can be proven by the following quote from Zinovyev: "There is no doubt that as time goes on, the

forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat will change, improve and in some ways soften. There is also no doubt that if we did not understand this we would not have been true Leninists."

There is no need to relate the minutes of the congress here: they are widely available and everyone can read them, especially since they make interesting reading. It is worth noting only that the position of Zinovyev and the Leningrad delegation was not, contrary to what was repeatedly stated later, a stab in the back. It was entirely based on the discussions that preceded the congress and on the fierce dispute between LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA, conducted by party officials as well as journalists. Positions were drawn up in advance.

Bukharin did not emerge unscathed from the confrontation with Zinovyev at the congress. He had to modify his views and even make a statement on his famous "Get Rich!" slogan, in effect retracting it.

But the main thing was that Zinovyev and his supporters lost the battle. The majority of the congress refused to follow them and they also lost the support of Leningrad party organizations. Even while the congress was in progress, Molotov, Kirov, Voroshilov, Andreyev and others traveled to Leningrad to meet with communists, and their work unquestionably bore fruit.

But, upon his return from the congress, Zinovyev did not give up the fight. In Leningrad, he published a supplement to the newspaper entitled "On the True and Imaginary Disagreements within Our Party." His influence was felt in the Leningrad komsomol organization's decision to declare its disagreement with the decisions of the 14th Congress. In 1926, Zinovyev was expelled from the Politburo and 1927, from the Central Committee.

On November 7, 1927, Zinovyev and his supporters refused to take up their seats on the official podium and appealed to participants of the demonstration on city streets. Judging by the contemporary newspaper reports, that tactic was not successful. On November 12, the plenum of the Central Committee and the TsKK expelled Zinovyev from the party.

The end of his political career was extremely unusual: in 1928 he was reinstated in the party, in 1932 expelled once again, in 1933 reinstated once more and in 1934 expelled for the third and final time.

In the year 1934, there was a date that fell like a black shadow on great many lives: on December 1, S.M. Kirov was villainously assassinated. The true circumstances of that tragedy remain unknown, but one fact remains undisputable: Stalin was able to exploit Kirov's death to stage an extremely broad campaign of repression, to annihilate physically all his real or potential rivals and opponents.

Trotskiy, who was then living abroad, announced that the murder was organized by Stalin. Stalin, in turn, accused Trotskiy, as well as Zinov'yev and Kamenev who had by then been expelled from the party.

In December 1934, Kirov's murderer Nikolayev and other members of the nonexistent Leningrad terrorist center were executed. Then, the following January, former party leaders Zinov'yev, Kamenev and others, and then Kamenev, his brother and others, were put on trial.

The investigation uncovered no evidence that they were involved in the terrorist act, but it was enough that the defendants presumably "knew of the terrorist designs of the Leningrad group and encouraged those designs themselves." Zinov'yev was sentenced to 10 years in jail and Kamenev to 5 years.

This, however, was only the beginning. The time of the 14th Congress was long passed and the respect for the Secretary General was quickly turning into a cult that would bloodily, like a heavy bulldozer, roll over the bodies of Lenin's comrades, the flower of the party.

In August 1936 Zinov'yev, Kamenev and 14 others found themselves in the dock once more, in the first of the famous Moscow trials of the Joint Trotsky-Zinov'yevian Center. How they had spent the time in jail and what they had felt can only be guessed. There can be no doubt, however, that they were much changed by then and that things said during the trial cannot be believed. All defendants were shot.

The same scenario was used for the 1937 Pyatakov-Radek and the 1938 Bukharin-Rykov trials. Thus, the man with whose hands Stalin had fought Zinov'yev at the 14th Congress outlived his opponent by only 2 years.

Civil rehabilitation of Zinov'yev does not entail party rehabilitation. It has been reliably established only that he did not plot Kirov's murder and did not commit any terrorist acts or other crimes. Whether or not he is guilty before the party will be determined by the special commission of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo. There is information that work is under way and that appropriate verdict will be issued.

However, it is important that a taboo has been lifted from the name of an outstanding participant of our revolution. Without the knowledge of his life story, struggle and works history would have been incomplete.

Zinov'yev's political legacy is large; he published over 250 works. He considered his most important works "The War and the Crisis of Socialism" and "The War and Socialism," which were written together with Lenin. In addition, he authored a number of political books. Before 1929, a 16-volume edition of his collective works was published. It came out without the 6 middle volumes, numbers 9 through 14.

He wrote a lot about Lenin. A large collection of his articles and memoirs, entitled "Lenin", saw two editions. That book was prefaced by a characteristic note to the reader:

"Author's Note: The author has reluctantly agreed to have these works and articles published in a separate volume. Much of it has been written in a hurry and stated without much forethought. Their publication can only be justified by the extraordinary desire to learn more about the work and life of Vladimir Ilyich which has swept the great masses of people.

"The author is working on a book about V.I.Lenin which will require many years of labor.

"The author feels that it will be his greatest joy to really write that book about Lenin and Leninism."

Unfortunately, the author was not allowed to do so, and the dream of that greatest joy was not fulfilled.

We have decided to publish a small excerpt from that book. Naturally, any work, even an article or a sketch, always conveys something of the character, the personality of the author. In this respect, this excerpt may tell the reader more about Zinov'yev than any summary of his biography.

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Post-War Soviet Errors in Dealing with Yugoslavia Deplored

18300342 Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
1 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Novopashin, sector head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System: "What Happened After the Comintern"]

[Text] The Comintern unquestionably performed great services in the restoration, strengthening, and expanding of international ties among the working people of different countries, which had been torn apart as a result of the collapse of the Second International at the start of World War I. The Comintern defended the theory of scientific socialism, worked out the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement under the new conditions, and helped to weld the vanguard of the working class into Marxist-Leninist parties. The important contribution made by Soviet communists in the Comintern's handling of all these tasks is not subject to doubt, and to this day it is emphasized by all communist and workers' parties.

However, the Stalinist dogmatization and distortion of Marxism-Leninism, direct deviations from it, and palpable manifestations of left-sectarianist, hegemonic tendencies in the policies of the pre-war leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet state deformed the

activities of the Comintern. This organization was seriously weakened as a result of unjust repressions carried out against Comintern cadres as well as their theoretical and political disorientation.

"The Yugoslav Affair"

On 15 May 1943, at the height of the war, the Comintern was disbanded by a decision of the presidium of its Executive Committee (IKKI), but the Stalinist leadership's pretensions of playing a leading role in the world revolutionary movement and of controlling the communist parties did not fade into the past. These pretensions manifested themselves with new force during the first post-war years in the activities of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform Buro), which was created in September 1947 and existed until April 1956 along with its official organ, the newspaper ZA PROCHNYY MIR, ZA NARODNUYU DEMOKRATIYU!.

Of the three conferences of representatives of the central committees of the nine parties that made it up, the last two—in 1948 and 1949—were connected with the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, the origins of which were the fault of Stalin and his closest entourage, primarily Beria, Zhdanov, and Suslov. They were trying to internationalize the conflict, to drag other parties and European socialist countries into it, and thus to impose complete isolation on Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Communist Party, to splinter it away from the international communist movement and the world system of socialism.

Attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign Yugoslav state, the Stalinists' coarse invective against the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party who dared to doubt the indisputable right of the "genius of all times and peoples" to give guidance directives, who dared to disagree with these directives, these things all started up after the Cominform bureau's resolution of 28 November 1949 titled "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies." This document, in particular, announced the establishment in Yugoslavia of "an anti-communist police state regime of the fascist type." In accordance with this assessment, the Cominform Buro decreed that "the struggle against the Tito clique—hired spies and murderers—is the internationalist duty of all communist and workers' parties."

In other words, in 1948-1949 there was a clear turn to constant attempts to ensure the homogeneity of political and economic structures of the people's democratic states based on "the Soviet model" and the leading role of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) on the basis of the unconditional support of the world's communist parties for the position of the Cominform Buro with regard to "the Yugoslav affair." As Hungarian scientist L. Bogar correctly noted, it was a heavy blow to the whole communist movement.

Consequences

It was a time of an abrupt chill in the ideological-political climate of the USSR and the other countries of socialism, a time of tracking down "Titoist agents," bourgeois nationalists, and other deviationists, and the organization of court trials of them. The press was dotted with all kinds of attacks against these "enemies of the people," with criticism of their theoretical and political positions which was most akin to deadly intimidation. "The Tito clique's betrayal of the cause of communism, the cause of socialist internationalism," announced D. Chesnokov, one of Stalin's ideologues, "is linked primarily to the fact that Tito and his clique...do not recognize the leadership role of the Soviet Union. This indicates that the matter of the leadership role of the working class and, on a world scale, the matter of the leadership role of the great Soviet Union and the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, is the fundamental question of communist construction, a fundamental question of the struggle for the final triumph of communism." Another author, I. Dudinskiy, unloaded the same righteous wrath on "Gomulka's rightist-nationalist group," which "advocates the treacherous theory of 'the Polish path to socialism' and denied the international importance of the Soviet experience of the construction of socialism." Still another Stalinist ideologue, M. Mitin, argued that in the other people's-democratic states as well "the unmasked agents of imperialism (Rajk, Kostov, Kochi Dzodze, Shvermova, and Slansky) were trying to carry out their subversive work under the banner of the struggle for specific "national" tasks, thus placing them in opposition to the internationalist tasks of the working people."

Naturally, at that time, it was the Soviet press which set the tone of the ideological anti-Yugoslav campaign in the countries of people's democracy, just as the falsified political trials in those countries not only took place under acknowledged Stalinist leadership but also, frequently, with the direct participation of the punitive organs of the criminal Beria. (In those years, the institution of Soviet advisors was part of the organs of security and internal affairs in the countries of the people's democracy. Let us recall some of the names of those who perished: K. Dzodze in Albania, T. Kostov and I. Stefanov in Bulgaria, L. Rajk, T. Syoni, A. Salan, and L. Brankov in Hungary, A. Pauker and V. Luca in Romania, and R. Slansky and V. Klimentis in Czechoslovakia. In Poland, W. Gomulka, M. Spychalski, Z. Kliszko, and a number of other party and state leaders were removed from their posts and thrown in prison.

This must be discussed frankly for the sake of complete historical truth and in order to cleanse our conscience and socialism itself of the "leaden abominations" of Stalinism. This is essential not only for the sake of unconditional condemnation of any and all manifestations of past interference in the affairs of the fraternal parties and countries, manifestations of hegemonism in

Soviet foreign policies, but also in order to ensure an unshakeable resolve that such anti-socialist phenomena will never again be permitted.

Honesty About the Past

In the three and a half decades since the death of Stalin, of course, serious efforts have been made to overcome the negative consequences in the USSR's domestic and foreign policies deriving from the saturating cult of "the leader and teacher." The leadership of the CPSU has renounced the essentially anti-Marxist pretensions to any exclusivity and role of leadership in the communist movement. Unfounded accusations against Yugoslavia, which was not subjected to Stalinist dictatorship, have been lifted. Back in May 1953, two months after Stalin's death, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with the country. In 1955, N. S. Khrushchev and N. A. Bulganin traveled to Belgrade "with cap in hand to Tito," as some unreconstructed Stalinists who were unhappy with the visit grumbled at the time. But the truth of the matter is that they went there to make an official apology to the Yugoslav leadership and to negotiate full normalization of inter-party and inter-state relations.

Many other leaders of communist parties and socialist countries did the same. Dolores Ibaruri recalls the following about a visit to Yugoslavia: "I went there with a heavy heart, intending (as the leader of the Spanish Communist Party had decided) to ask Tito's forgiveness for what happened in 1948, when the Cominform decided to 'exclude' Yugoslavia from the community of socialist countries."

The result was that the joint Soviet-Yugoslav document widely known as the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 was signed. The text included an extraordinarily important stipulation, one which was new to documents of that type, about noninterference "in internal affairs for any

reason—economic, political, or ideological, inasmuch as problems of internal organization, differences in social systems and differences in concrete forms of the development of socialism are the exclusive affair of the peoples of the individual countries." This marked the return to the Leninist idea of the varied character of the socialist world, the importance of which in the preceding years had been definitely diminished in favor of the Stalinist dogmatic concept of homogeneity and diktat.

To be sure, the fact that this stipulation was proclaimed did not mean that it was automatically followed in every situation. The past still held on tenaciously (and for many years), manifesting itself in anti-Soviet attacks from the Yugoslav side and anti-Yugoslav attacks from the Soviet side. In particular, there were anti-Yugoslav passages in N. S. Khrushchev's reports at the 21st and 22nd CPSU congresses and in the Third Party Program which was adopted in 1961. Neither did the subsequent leadership (Brezhnev and Suslov) hasten to distance themselves publicly from the past; they never discussed the theme of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, thus leaving room for guardedness, suspicion, mistrust, and resentment.

This is why M. S. Gorbachev considered it a principled necessity to talk about these difficult matters during his recent visit to Yugoslavia. The new Soviet-Yugoslav declaration includes an important stipulation which reflects the new thinking: "On the basis of the conviction that no one has a monopoly on truth, the two sides declare that they have no pretensions to impose their own ideas about social development upon anyone whomsoever. The success of any of the paths to socialism is verified by social-political practice and is confirmed by concrete results."

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Data Supplied on Religion in Kirghizia

18330407 [Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETTIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz 23 June 1988 carries on page 2 a 1400-word article by M. Abdylayev, cand. phil. sci., headlined "We Must Move Away From Religious Belief" on serious shortcomings in the conduct of atheist education in Issyk Kol Oblast. He warns that "the participation by leaders of certain oblast party and soviet organs, members of the CPSU and VLKSM in religious rites (burials, for example) is having a negative influence on the conduct of atheist work among the youth." He points out that one sign of this "complacency" is that the number of atheist lectures in some rayons has fallen. With regard to church and mosque attendance in the oblast, he notes that "at the end of 1987 6 Russian Orthodox and 4 protestant churches, and 2 Muslim

mosques were in operation. If the number of churchgoers in 1983 numbered 500 on normal days, it reached 4500 on religious holidays. In 1987 this number had dropped to 320 and 3500 respectively. As facts reveal, the number of churchgoers is dropping every year. A similar situation is observed at the mosques: if in 1983 32 people attended mosques on normal days and 1350 on religious holidays, in 1987 this number dropped to 24 and 827 respectively". With regard to contributions made by the population to church or mosque, he notes that "while the income of the Russian Orthodox church in 1984 was 129,000 rubles, it had fallen to 116,200 in 1986; as for contributions to mosques, they rose from 27,900 rubles to 31,200 in the same years." He adds that "the number of unregistered mullahs in the oblast has also dropped: for example, there were 85 in 1983 and only 48 in 1987."

Education Only Solution to Prostitution Problem
18300296 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 19,
9-15 May 88 p 11

[Article by Leonid Zhukhovitskiy: "Nina From the Riga Detention Center: A Writer's Notes"]

[Text] Just what strange sort of commercial activity is prostitution? What supports it? What gives it vitality?

And what a vitality! It has existed for thousands of years. In our time, in our society, it has not only held its ground but has also acquired a unique prestige, having been forced to advertise itself rather loudly.

Perhaps there is no need to analyze the fact that prostitution is bad. It is both a violation of the spirit and a breeding-ground for venereal diseases, while it murders love by converting it into a commodity... Yet, it might be worth considering something else here—what is good about it?

Let us try to analyze: how do young prostitutes enter their ancient profession? There are numerous detailed biographies and yet, all the same, it is extremely difficult to answer this question. How can we identify the borderline, beyond which an amateur is happy to become a professional?

One little step is almost indistinguishable from any other...

A girl met a man, went to his house to listen to music and spent the night. Obviously, there is nothing commendable here, but how can this be considered prostitution?

The girl met a man, went to an ice cream shop with him and then spent the night with him.

She went with him to a restaurant and then spent the night.

She spent the night and then received a gift.

She spent the night and then received money to buy a gift.

She spent the night and then received money, but now without the ritual phrase "pick out something that you like..."

So, where is this fateful border-line?

The point is that the "gift" is not just a little step, but an entire flight of stairs. There are no indicators of what is proper or improper. A bouquet of flowers—this is approved and even recommended. A box of candy? Cute little plastic earrings? A scarf? A vest? A blouse? Or "pick out something that you like...?"

At which stage should one turn back in terror? All told, the girl just wanted to have a good time while she was still young and, presto!—she was "already bought and paid for." It was paid for once, and then again, and then "for free" became both offensive and disadvantageous. Today girls have expenses, as you yourselves know...

Since it was thought that we had no prostitution, we also have no scientific studies or statistics on it. I was forced to make do with empirical, selective data and the opinions of experienced people.

Militia Major Mark Dubovitskiy, chief of the Riga UVD detention center, has 20 years of experience in this area. Dubovitskiy believes that prostitutes can be divided into four basic categories.

The international prostitutes are professional aristocrats. Foreigners and only foreigners! They seek clients in the hotels but, as a rule, they work at home, renting an apartment. To put it politely, the concert fee for these ladies is up to 100 rubles or 30 dollars. An international prostitute makes about 400-500 rubles per month. Why so little? Because foreigners are not standing in line for them. Once a week, a snow-white liner full of tourists comes here and then the girls have a chance.

However, even this 500 does not all go into savings—there are high overhead expenses. She must pay for the apartment and her clothing. And, after all, if she wants her guest to leave 100 rubles, she has to set the table, even if it is only 10 rubles worth of food: if she stinted, he will stint too.

The most successful of the noted foreign currency prostitutes in Riga has a two-room apartment and a video cassette recorder. She got the apartment from her mother and the VCR on her own. She has no car, no dacha, not even the simple luxuries which rumor attributes to prostitutes.

Where did the legends of wild dividends come from? Firstly, the ladies themselves lie: it is fun to boast of high earnings. Secondly, the journalists lie: the bigger the figures, the more interesting the article. Thirdly, the readers themselves readily and enthusiastically lie: man is weak and loves to count the money in other people's pockets. Indeed, we thus imagine that a soccer player makes 100,000, a singer makes a million, and prostitutes—a million too, but in foreign currency!

The second category is the regular prostitutes. These serve their fellow countrymen, in view of little erudition. They prefer sailors arriving from abroad, northerners on vacation and officers on business trips. Their fees are significantly lower, yet their range of clientele is broader. Alas, they do not balk at direct criminal activity and are fully capable of ransacking the pockets of a drunken client. They earn an income from the level of that of a young specialist to that of a candidate of science, depending on how they behave.

The third category is the long-range travelers, or "hitch-hikers." They perform their specific service along the country's endless roads. They sometimes cover tremendous distances in the cabins of enormous refrigerated trucks, large freight cars, and modest trucks, switching from track to track, roadside to roadside, car to car, and man to man. They live as though on a business trip: food and shelter must be paid for, but their earnings are not sent home. There are bonuses—one man gives money for stockings, one buys some clothing, another replaces shoes worn out upon the stones of five climatic and seven time zones. These girls basically come from the provinces, villages and small cities. After having noisily and foolishly squandered the age of first love, having ground that which was once called a reputation to dust, having strained their relations with relatives and friends to the utter limit, these recent secondary school graduates set their gaze upon the local, republic and, better yet, Union highways. The romance of distant roads! They want a great deal, although they themselves do not know specifically what. Their main desire is to live an interesting life while they are still young.

Finally, the fourth and last category—the homeless prostitutes, the ones who periodically fill the rooms of the detention center. These are poor in all parameters. They have no income, no hope, no home, no past (forgotten, lost), no relatives and no profession, and nobody needs them, even as prostitutes. However, nevertheless, occasionally something along this line comes their way—a cutlet at a cafeteria and a bottle of cheap cologne. They cannot do without the bottle: almost all homeless prostitutes are alcoholics.

Dubovitskiy believes that there are about 300 professional prostitutes in Riga. The traveling ones are guests here, and therefore the contingent is divided among the remaining categories in approximately equal shares. A third are foreign currency prostitutes, and a third are homeless.

The homeless category includes former foreign currency, dock-side and traveling prostitutes. Few of them escape this fate. The path from a hotel restaurant to a brick house with bars on the windows takes, as a rule, from 2 to 15 years. Sometimes it is even shorter.

Marina grew up in the Urals in a working family, and her parents had higher education. They raised her strictly, so, when she finished school she decided to live a bit further away from home. Riga served the purpose.

She failed to get into a prestigious school and did not want to go to an unprestigious one. Raised "by rules," the young woman suddenly discovered the extraordinarily rich possibilities that lay beyond their framework.

Marina herself related her past, in writing, at the detention center. "My way of life: I worked in Yurmala at the "Lido" restaurant and at others. I entered into sexual relations only with married men (or so they said), and they paid me by taking me to restaurants or with other types of services (tickets to the theater or a good concert). I had sexual relations only with men who had good connections and money. I paid for nothing myself. Mother sent me very little money (only 100 rubles), with which one could not go to restaurants. I was a girl before coming to Riga, but I became a woman immediately after I arrived in Riga. That is how everything started. I realized that I could support myself through sexual relations, without working, so that is what I did. My parents knew nothing about this, and I beg you to tell them nothing..."

I would like to explain that, besides restaurants and services, I sometimes accepted money as well, sometimes 50, sometimes 25 rubles. They would put the money in my pocket and I would count it later. I spent this money on fashionable clothing. In August, I went from Riga to Tallin for three days, to see the city. I visited a young man whom I had met in Riga: he is rich, works as a pastry-cook and said that he gets a lot of money from work. I had sexual relations with him, for which he took care of me and bought me a train ticket.

I do not like alcoholic drinks and I try not to drink when I lie with a man. In my opinion, alcohol ruins one's appearance and I want to preserve my attractive face.

I know many guys from the "black market." Relations with them are normal, but I am not intimate with them: I think they are small fry and show-offs."

Marina traveled the path from girl to homeless prostitute in slightly over a year!

Incidentally, how is this homelessness determined? The militia men pick up those professionals who have suffered misfortune, usually at the train station and the marketplace. The telltale signs are the dirty clothing, a swollen face and the odor—that of a long-unwashed body...

They showed me Nina from Belorussia at the Riga center. Where does she live? She has friends, but remembers neither last names nor addresses. Tall and well-built, she was once, apparently, very pretty. What did she acquire in her 26 years? Everything she possesses is on her. True, the report also noted a "Polet" watch in a white metal casing and 27 kopeks in change. That is it!

So where have all the "50-kopek pieces," the 10-, 5- and 3-ruble notes gone? What hole have all the dollars, pounds, marks and crowns been poured into? What do they wear themselves out working for?

Actually, prostitutes pay a great deal of money. After all, she pays right and left, neither bargaining nor counting: to the proprietress for the "house," the neighbor for silence, the taxi driver for complaisance and the precinct inspector for his near-sightedness. How much does the pimp known as "Igor" take for introductions to "men of Caucasian nationality," as he himself later describes it at the militia office? How much does the madam they call the "Lame Lady" take, who, having lost her consumer value in her 30's, now sells not her own but other people's bodies?

Winter brings serious problems for prostitutes. The health resort visitors have gone away, tourists are rare and the dachas are boarded up. The prices for housing go up, while those for girls fall. There are no choices any more. They go with whomever beckons, simply for dinner and a bed. And if no one wants them? The train station, the train station again, and then public shelter in a house with bars on the windows—for a month. In this month, the authenticity of documents is verified, she is tested for tuberculosis and venereal diseases and, if there is no need for treatment, work is found for her.

Prostitution is a one-way street, from foreign currency to homelessness...

So where is the profit in this?

If you were to look at one day from the life of a prostitute, you might be completely surprised: in one night she sometimes makes more than an academician gets for a day! Yet, if you look at 10 or 15 years, you would be startled by her poverty. A considerable amount "spills out of the cup," and virtually nothing makes it to the lips. In practice, a prostitute sells herself not so much for the money, as for the possibility of holding it in her hands.

According to research by Georgian sociologists, out of 100 professionals only nine thought that they lived well and only seven somehow managed to put something aside for the uncertain future. If this study had been carried out among weavers and cooks, or even among engineers, then, I think, the percentage of successes would have been somewhat higher...

The world's oldest profession is usually considered immoral but highly profitable. An objective analysis indicates that this is not so. Selling one's body is no more immoral than profiteering through one's job, talent or mind. However, it is less profitable. If pretty Nina had studied, however averagely, and gone to work like everyone else, today she might have had far more than a bunk at the militia detention center, a "Polet" watch with a white metal casing and 27 kopeks.

Thus, should we accept prostitution as an unavoidable evil, place it under medical supervision and tax it as an individual labor activity, or in a word, sanction and legalize it? There is too much being bought and sold in

the world. If love is turned into a commodity now, what will we turn into in two or three generations? Here, rather like a Chekhovian character, I am prepared to bluntly assert: this should not be, because it should never be...

Unfortunately, one must also consider the fact that life is completely capable of ignoring my emotions. One turns to one's own opinion, nevertheless. We take our strict measures, but prostitution takes its own: it sinks in deeper, it adapts, grows wiser and survives our indignation, just as it has survived all prohibitions to this day. What can we do about this unfortunate, but utterly real prospect? How can we protect today's ninth-grader from the future's compulsory test for syphilis and AIDS? What can oppose this calculating debauchery?

I do not believe much in morality, because today's girls themselves do not particularly believe in it. I do not believe in fear—what would you frighten them with! Thinking sensibly, one can believe only in love. Love, perhaps, will protect them.

True, all of our upbringing in this area will have to be restructured.

After all, the indifferently condemning, cynical and calculating attitude of young people did not fall from the sky—we ourselves instilled it in our teen-agers. For decades we spoke of any love, except for the lofty, publicly-acceptable prelude to marriage directed by parents, either condemningly or scornfully—and any self-respecting girl would ignore such idiocies. Love is often crossed out of books and cut from films. In struggling for morality, the shameless sterilization of the soul took place.

Nothing good has ever come of hypocrisy before, and nothing good has come of it this time either. Self-respecting girls could care less about condemnation and have mastered scorn. Today it is fashionable to disbelieve in the merging of souls and to consider the merging of bodies unimportant—as they say, intimate contact is scarcely even a cause for acquaintance. They even get married, not to live together, but to live together for a while, as long as it is pleasant. Alas, a bond without love, even with a stamp on a document, will not be pleasant for long.

Of late, great hopes have been set on sex education. I share these hopes only partially. Just as you cannot become a poet by memorizing 300 rhymes, a kiss studied in a book does not increase one's inspiration. Of course, eliminating sexual illiteracy is necessary and a sensible

textbook on sexology would be of some use here, but I have greater faith in Bunin's "Dark Alleys," in Berns, Yesenin, Okudzhava...

There is no need to foist love upon people or even to propagandize it. We must simply stop exterminating it in life and art. Then love will be able to look after itself.

However, this program will take decades. What can we do in the meanwhile? Today, tomorrow?

Today, I think, the best we can do is to tell the truth about prostitution. Let our ninth-graders know everything about the oldest profession: both about the restaurant table and the 25 dollars for a night's service, and about the bunks at the militia detention center and 27 kopeks in one's pocket...

13362

**NKAO Events Inconsistent with Goals of
Perestroyka, Glasnost**
18300389 Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA
in Russian 28 Jun 88 pp 2-3

[Article by E. Namazov, candidate of historical sciences, associate at the AzSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History: "What Is Behind the Slogans?"]

[Text] Events in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and around it, causing a chain reaction of negative phenomena in other regions of Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia, continue to alarm millions of people in our country. What is at the basis of these events? What prompted part of the population of NKAO to demand that the oblast be separated from the AzSSR and annexed to the ArSSR? The numerous articles in the press have still not provided a clear answer to these questions, and this is not by chance. The point is, there is considerable distance between what is on the surface, catches the eye and is reflected in the press and the inner springs of the events and their driving force. The articles have basically touched upon the occasions and consequences of the events that have taken place, not dealing with their causes. Without claiming to analyze the problem comprehensively (these events require comprehensive study on the part of social scientists), in this article I would like to touch upon a number of important aspects of the events around Nagornyy Karabakh.

Above all, what evokes natural interest is: What slogans are the participants in the events in NKAO and Armenia advancing? How do they justify their demands and goals? Of all the diverse slogans with which the people have taken to the streets, three can be isolated: returning to Armenia "historically Armenian lands;" "One Nation—One Republic ("One People—One Land" is a variation); and the right to "national self-determination" of the Armenian population of NKAO. There is a need to look closely at these slogans which are united by the idea of "appeasing national interests." Their outward attractiveness is also one of the main reasons that they have found support in a considerable portion of the population in the oblast and in neighboring Armenia. From all appearances, this is precisely what the organizers of the events were counting on; how else could they have involved such a large number of people in the events.

Regarding the first slogan, it touches upon a whole complex of problems related to the political and ethnic history of the area. It hardly makes sense to go into a detailed analysis of them, especially since readers can get an idea of the particular characteristics of the conception of the ancient and early medieval history of the region from scientific and popular scientific works published recently in the republic. Here it is much more important to determine what role in general we assign to the "historical factor" in resolving modern problems concerning the building of nation-states in our country. Can we agree with making this factor absolute or with the

desire to restore our ethnopolitical boundaries in accordance with historical maps of ancient times and the Middle Ages? Can we ignore the entire complex of present-day social, economic and political factors which developed in the course of socialist construction and not take into account the interests of other peoples? The result of ignoring them and making the historical factor absolute in solving such problems is also graphically demonstrated by the experience of international affairs and various "hot" spots, the Middle East in particular. An opposite, positive example, also from international experience, is to expand the policy of detente. It became possible to achieve it based on the fundamental understanding of the need to take into account the realities of the postwar world, the boundaries and the political systems which took shape. This understanding became the basis on which we began to resolve constructively the problems that had built up and to strengthen trust among peoples.

The need to study the historical processes of the formation and settling of peoples is obvious, but it should also be obvious that the current policy and direction of building nation-states cannot be determined by a slogan about restoring the "historical correctness" of 1,000 years ago. These quotation marks should not bother the reader. This is an important methodological principle, since the constant changeability and instability of ethnic and political boundaries in historical dynamics make it actually impossible to determine any "universal" settlement location of peoples which could be taken as the basis. How, for example, can you compare this slogan with the generally known fact that the Armenian people were formed and initially settled beyond the Transcaucasus on the territory of Asia Minor? Or, perhaps, we can take as the basis those medieval periods when the state formations of Azerbaijan united vast territories of the Transcaucasus, Asia Minor, Western Asia and the Near East? Let us say frankly that this is an absurd and by no means harmless game in geopolitics with history...

Let us turn now to another slogan: "One Nation—One Republic." This means that the current settlement boundaries of the Armenians do not coincide with their state (republic) borders. Problems associated with the role of the "ethnic territory" factor at various historical stages always were and remain at the center of attention of ethnographers. Today scientists have no doubts that the discrepancy between ethnic and state boundaries is not some random, isolated fact, but the natural and inevitable result of the historical development of peoples. Here, for example, is how the summary "Problems of Ethnic Geography and Cartography" by leading Soviet ethnographers, published fairly recently, phrases this pattern: "Whereas the synonymous correspondence of ethnic and state territory at the tribal level of ethnic development could be a real reality at some stages, at the nationality level it can be merely some boundary which is virtually unattainable or realized in particularly rare instances (Icelanders in Iceland). The same factors which lead to the formation and consolidation of a nation..., at

the same time contribute to the emergence and continual resumption of phenomena of mixed settlement." Thus, in the 1920's, when the building of nation-states was being accomplished in the USSR, Ukrainians comprised 48.5 percent of the population of Moldavia, 13.2 percent of Kazakhstan, and 7.4 percent of the RSFSR; Tajiks comprise 7.9 percent of Uzbekistan; Uzbeks comprise 21.2 percent of Tajikistan and so forth, not to mention many millions of Russians in all republics. V.I. Lenin pointed out in this connection that the "nationality composition of the population...is not the sole and not the most important among the others (factors—E.N.)" and that "Marxists should not base themselves completely and exclusively on the 'national-territorial' principle." Thus, the Soviet republics were primordially structured as republics with mixed population. Regarding the Transcaucasus region, for example, today a compact group of more than half a million Azerbaijanis populate the northeastern areas of Armenia, eastern areas of Georgia, and southern areas of Dagestan. In turn, several hundred thousand Armenians live in Azerbaijan, and thousands of Georgian-speaking Ingilos. A similar situation exists throughout the country as a whole. What is more, the phenomenon of mixed settlement will intensify in the future, since the processes of the population's migration between republics is intensifying, the rate of natural growth of various peoples differs, and so forth. Thus, the goal of "correcting" state borders does not have any clear prospects. In this case, in the future we would inevitably begin recarving the maps and revising constitutions. Not to mention the fact that we cannot isolate only one aspect and make one-sided demands from the historically established complex phenomenon of mixed settlement and the disparity between ethnic and state boundaries. This can only result in exacerbating relations between nationalities and dissension between nationalities.

Those who demanded that NKAO be transferred to the Armenian SSR also tried to justify their actions from the standpoint of the right to national self-determination. Just which of their rights were violated in the course of building nation-states in the USSR? We would remind the readers that the Leninist principles of comprehensive economic, cultural and political development of peoples and destroying former national inequality underlie the national policy of our state.

The "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" signed by V.I. Lenin on 2 (15) November 1917 included the following points:

- a) the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia;
- b) the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination right up to separating and forming an independent state;
- c) abolishing all and any national and national-religious privileges and restrictions;
- d) free development of national minorities and ethnic groups populating the territory of Russia.

Following this, the Soviet of People's Commissars passed the address "To all Moslem Working People of Russia and the East," which confirmed the same rights of the Moslem peoples and contained an appeal to them to support the socialist revolution.

So, just what rights of the Armenian population of NKAO were not granted in the AzSSR? Are not the creation of an autonomous oblast with oblast self-government and representation in the highest bodies of power in the republic and the country, the elimination of economic and cultural inequality during the years of socialist construction, the creation of modern industry and a nationality contingent of the working class and intelligentsia in the oblast, and the opportunity for free development of its culture not really the implementation of the principle of national self-determination and the Leninist national policy?

The right to self-determination also has an important addition: "right up to separating and forming an independent state." This statement was historically necessary and fundamental in connection with the existence in tsarist Russia of national oppression and infringement of national interests. At the very outset of formation of the Soviet state, it provided every peoples the opportunity to determine their own attitude toward the socialist community of peoples being conceived. The Finns and certain areas populated by Poles took advantage of this right. It is unnecessary to say that, having made the voluntary decision to be a part of the USSR, each people, each nation, receiving guarantees of free and equal development, also assumed the corresponding obligations to strengthen this union, obligations stemming from the very nature of the multinational proletarian state. In this regard, in the work "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," V.I. Lenin particularly emphasized the "savoir faire" of the bourgeoisie in this matter, who sought to support any national aspirations and to ensure preferential advantages for their nation. He spoke of the inseparable linkage of implementation of the right to self-determination and the class interests of the proletariat, with absolute priority of the latter: "Therefore, the proletariat is limited by the negative, so to speak, requirement of recognizing the right to self-determination without guaranteeing any nation, without obliging itself to another nation.

"Even if this is not 'practical,' it actually guarantees best of all the most democratic of all possible solutions; the proletariat needs only these guarantees, but the bourgeoisie of each nation needs guarantees of its advantages without regard to the position (to possible disadvantages) of other nations..."

"The proletariat is opposed to such *savoir faire*: Recognizing equality and the equal right to a national state, it values and places above all the union of proletariats of all

nations, assessing a national demand and any national separation from the standpoint of the class struggle of the workers. The slogan of *savoir faire* is actually merely a slogan of uncritical adoption of bourgeois aspirations." In light of Leninist ideas, how should we assess this peculiar understanding of the right of nations to self-determination which was demonstrated by the organizers and inspirers of the Nagorno-Karabakh events?

Undoubtedly, we should also ponder whether or not this right is applicable, and how, with respect to numerous groups of one people settled outside their own republic. In order to express more graphically the complexity of this aspect, let us ask the question: Do the more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis living in Armenia, most of whom live compactly in areas bordering Azerbaijan, have the right to use this right and demand that the territory they are living on be joined to the Azerbaijan SSR? No clear-cut answer was given to this question, which I had the opportunity to ask my opponents during debates in Moscow in March and April of this year...

During rallies and demonstrations in Stepanakert and Yerevan, there was quite a bit said in support of *perestroika*, democratization and *glasnost*. However, the specific actions and immediate steps undertaken by the participants in the events to achieve their goals, honestly speaking, cause bewilderment. Already the day after the regrettably well-known session of the oblast soviet, working life in the oblast was paralyzed, and several days later the slogan "Strike Until Victory" was openly proclaimed. Sometime later, similar things also occurred in Yerevan. How can these actions agree with the goals of *perestroika*, democratization and *glasnost*?

Soviet legislation neither directly prohibits nor legalizes strikes. It seems to me that it is clear how such phenomena should be assessed from the standpoint of our ideology and morality. But there are people who also try to link the strikes with democratization of our society and present them as a possible method for working people to express their positions in specific instances. The role of the strike movement in capitalist countries undoubtedly has a most direct influence on such an understanding of the problem. However, let us give this some thought.

In capitalist countries, where enterprises are basically in the hands of private businessmen, strikes by workers indeed are an important instrument of class struggle. Faced with material losses, one or another capitalist undoubtedly is forced to consider the workers' demands and satisfy some of them. But whom is a strike directed against in a socialist state, which has public ownership of the means of production and a planned economy which is interconnected between the various regions and enterprises? Who in the end bears the material losses? Whose pockets will they have compensate for them? It is clear

that this diktat actually turns its point against the workers themselves and the various regions. It is not someone's profits or superprofits that decrease, but our overall well-being and capability to build houses and schools, hospitals and sanatoriums, to increase wages and pensions, and so forth. In such cases, it seems to us, there is no harm in also thinking about the legal protection of the interests of all workers against the diktat of group interests...

Regarding the intelligent, democratic discussion of the problems existing in the sphere of relations between nationalities and reaching a mutual agreement based on the respect of nationalistic feelings and interests of one another—is there really no other way to achieve them?

Do we have to explain to the Azerbaijanis, who still have a feeling of bitterness and concern for the fate of their millions of people in Iran who experience the most serious barriers in developing a national language and culture, about the feeling of separation? Really, have not we all—Azerbaijanis and Armenians, Russians and Uzbeks—during the years of stagnation had to ponder with bitterness the condition of our historical and cultural monuments and the fate of our historical memory? Is this not why the revolutionary *perestroika* restructuring of all spheres of life is taking place in our country so that we can raise and solve all these problems in a calm and businesslike atmosphere?

The events in NKAO undoubtedly will become the subject of the most intent analysis on the part of scientists of various types and specialists. But now we already can and must draw a number of conclusions for ourselves and learn the first necessary lessons.

The public of the republic, its party and Soviet leadership have learned a bitter lesson. We proved to be unprepared to prevent the Nagorno-Karabakh events and those negative phenomena which they caused. We were unable to assess in time the possible direction of events and the degree of influence on the workers of the extremist, provocative appeals of a number of irresponsible individuals at times having no ties or knowledge of the history, economics, language or specifics of our republic.

For a long time, a number of politically incompetent and, frankly, nationalistically sentimental individuals spread in various articles and publications a negative perception of the history and culture of neighboring peoples and made attacks and insinuations which insulted the feelings of millions of people. There is no doubt that this provocative fuss, which was not cut off in time, largely paved the way for the Nagorno-Karabakh events, electrified the situation, and sowed the seeds of mutual distrust and alienation.

That which we call "legal ignorance" also played its own negative role in increasing tension and in its grave consequences. Even after the firm and clear statement by

the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and after the appeal by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev to the workers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, there were still people who began spreading rumors that the leadership of the country had decided to reconsider and satisfy the demands put forward by the participants in the events. Of course, experienced agent provocateurs could not help but know that, under Article 78 of the USSR Constitution and Article 70 of the AzSSR Constitution (a corresponding article is also contained in the constitutions of all other union republics), the territory of a republic can be changed only by consent and corresponding decision of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. This is a reliable constitutional protection of the interests of the Soviet republics. An appeal to other all-union authorities, in all probability, had the objective of giving the workers the illusion that their constitution rights could become the subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations and command methods of government. This was a direct blow to the policy of democratization of our society and an attempt to place in doubt one of the important elements of the process of perestroika. The legal ignorance of a significant number of people was clearly demonstrated in the fact that this illusion, on the one hand, and uncertainty, on the other, for a long time dominated public sentiment and became a factor which supercharged the already complex psychological climate of those days. It is quite necessary to emphasize this aspect of the events that occurred, since life in a multi-national state can still force us to resolve similar problems.

How often have we talked about the provocative activities and ideological sabotage of Western radio announcers who during those days filled the airwaves with a huge amount of misinformation and lies. Depending on where the center of tension shifted, they fed information which was aimed at intensifying unneeded passions and heated up distrust and the acuteness which had emerged in relations between nationalities. Hastily declaring the friendship among the peoples of the USSR to be a "propaganda myth," they did not conceal their jubilation regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh events. On 2 March, Voice of America broadcast an interview with dissidents of the Baltic republics, who stated that the events around Nagornyy Karabakh were giving them great moral support in their struggle to separate the republics of the Soviet Baltic from the USSR. Indeed—tell me, who is your friend...

We will neither dramatize nor oversimplify the situation. The slogans and demands of the participants in the events actually came down to advancing ideas about a "purely national republic" (the coincidence with the slogan on racial or nationality "purity" here is by no means phraseological). This is a fundamentally new and alarming aspect in the development of national relations in our country. The slogan "One Nation—One Republic" places in doubt the priority of those fundamental principles on which national relations in the USSR have been structured through the years, such as social and

economic unity, political union, and proletarian internationalism. It places them in doubt not only in a theoretical context but also in a practical context, since under conditions of the objectively developed mixed settlement of peoples it can be accomplished only by the well-known (more precisely, unknown both in scale and strategic results) breaking down of established social, economic and ideological ties. An attempt to galvanize and revive in our day the inter-nation claims which emerged and were formulated in bourgeois-nationalist circles back long before establishment of Soviet power, besides everything else, is an attempt to place in doubt the achievements of the CPSU national policy and one of the key points in the CPSU Program that the nationality problem, as we inherited it from tsarism, has been resolved in the USSR.

It is time for social scientists to pay closest attention to the category of "national interests," which we often use in vain and which is poorly elaborated in the scientific context. New thinking, which has already begun to announce itself imperiously in many spheres of our life, inevitably must also touch upon this question. Apparently, for a long time we have wrongly disregarded the fact that much of what we call "national interests" entered our historical memory back during the periods of feudal strife and bourgeois-nationalist aspirations. Among the entire complex of phenomena associated with the current understanding of "national interests" (I have in mind not scientific knowledge, of course, but popular mentality), it is important to see distinctly what runs counter to the interests of other peoples, the friendship of peoples and the class interests of our society. Apparently, we must spread in our society the understanding of what is a specific "hierarchy" of national interests, the most important of which are strengthening friendship between peoples and proletarian internationalism. All other conceptions and orientations of popular mentality, which for a long time we have perceived as perpetual national interests and not subject to doubt, now in the era of revolutionary renovation must be verified and compared to the interests of all peoples of our country. In a multinational proletarian state there should not be "national interests" which if realized would contribute to the emergence of friction between nationalities, distrust and tension. There should not be, but, as the Nagorno-Karabakh events showed, there are. They are held by a certain part of the national intelligentsia who does not have a clear class approach to assessing historical events and the interests of their people. They are held by a certain part of the population making it possible for them to be easily enticed by the path of dissension between nationalities. We should establish firmly and definitely an understanding that meeting the true national needs and interests and the blossoming forth of socialist nations are ensured not by the degree of ethnic homogeneity of the national republics, not by their size, and not by their numbers and the numerical predominance of some peoples over others (absolutizing these factors borders directly on national egoism and

narrowmindedness), but by the rights of nations consolidated in the USSR Constitution and ensured by the country's socio-political system and by the Leninist national policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

12567

Armenian Student Construction Brigades to Work in NKAO

*18300301a Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
16 Jun 88 p 2*

[Appeal of the Republic Staff of Student Brigades to the Members of Armenian Student Brigades]

[Text] Dear friends!

The labor semester-88 is beginning under the conditions of the developed radical restructuring of Komsomol work and the emergence of Komsomol organizations from a state of inertia and stagnation to leading positions in the process of renovation of all areas of our life.

SO fighters! Our time urgently demands to ensure the safe participation in labor semesters and to declare a real war to slackness, criminal indifference, and a resigned attitude toward the violators of the rules of safety at work and in daily life and leisure time. We must provide a principled assessment of manifestations of irresponsibility and of any violations of behavioral standards by SO fighters.

The process of change which has affected all areas of our life could not fail to affect the student brigades. A new procedure for financial support of SO activities was approved this year. Essentially it consists of converting the brigades to independent financing. In other words, the SO will assess by themselves the funds they have at their disposal and how to spend them. The sociological studies which were made lead us to assert that most students who are joining the SO this year would like tangibly to improve their financial status.

Extensive knowledge by every SO member of his rights and obligations and combining his interests with those of the economic authorities and making thorough and comprehensive preparations for all production stages and sociopolitical work are the foundations for the successful implementation of the tasks facing this patriotic movement.

The area of deployment of the SO is very expensive. This year the republic student detachment will participate in the implementation of the program for socioeconomic development of the NKAO.

This summer students from different VUZs in Yerevan will work on the construction of the Askeran poultry farm in the NKAO.

With a view to ensuring within the shortest possible time housing for our compatriots, who were victimized in Sumgait, the republic's SO will join in the construction of housing in Ashtarakskiy, Nairiyskiy and Abovyan Rayons. During the labor semester a shock labor day will be dedicated to aid to the victims in Sumgait.

Dear friends! Participation in the implementation of the program for the socioeconomic development of the NKAO is a manifestation of patriotism and a feeling of civic duty by the Armenian SO members, whose activities in all areas of our country have established their worth consistent with the best traditions of internationalism and mutual aid.

We wish you good health and great successes in labor and social work. Return victorious!

05003

Historian Scores Media Handling of NKAO Issues

*18300301b Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
16 Jun 88 p 2*

[Interview with Yerevan State University professor Lendrush Arshakovich Khurshudyan, conducted by V. Aydinyan: "Linking Our Fate to Perestroyka"]

[Text] In connection with recent events, a KOMSOMOLETS correspondent asked a number of questions of professor Lendrush Arshakovich Khurshudyan, doctor of historical sciences and head of the Armenian History Department, Yerevan State University. Following is a record of this conversation.

[Question] Lendrush Arshakovich, we would like to know your view on the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh and the reasons for the meetings and demonstrations in Armenia.

[Answer] It is my deep conviction that a gross error was made in July 1921 in the area of resolving national problems. The Leninist principles of self-determination of nations were violated. The decision to include Nagornyy Karabakh within Azerbaijan was made arbitrarily, ignoring the most important factors: the historical affiliation of the territory and the expression of the population's will. With no justification whatsoever the decision was based only on the economic factor and it was on this unstable foundation that the destiny of an entire area, 94 percent of whose population is Armenian, was decided. The following question is natural: If the economic factor was all that important, why was it that Nakhichevan was not made part of Armenia, for it is organically related to Armenia through strong economic ties? This abnormal situation, which has existed for a number of decades, is the result of Stalin's arbitrary policy. This was a policy which had nothing in common with the stipulations of Marxist-Leninist theory on the national problem. As early as the end of June 1920, in a telegram to Ordzhonikidze, Stalin demanded that the

question of the disputed territories be solved in favor of Azerbaijan and Turkey. On 7 July 1920 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo, chaired by V.I. Lenin, rejected Stalin's requirement and adopted as a decisive criterion the wish of the native population in the area. In July 1921, however, Stalin solved the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh in favor of Azerbaijan. Let me point out that prior to this, the question of Western Armenia had been solved in favor of Turkey.

[Question] We have repeatedly read in the central press statements to the effect that the events in Nagornyy Karabakh were totally unexpected by anyone. To the best of my knowledge, however, this problem has a long history. We know that as early as its 16 July 1921 session, the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee opposed this solution of the fate of Nagornyy Karabakh and expressed its disagreement with the Caucasian Buro 5 July 1921 Decree. Subsequently as well this question continued to concern the minds. In general, the answer is clear but we would like to know your view as to why this question has been raised once again just now?

[Answer] During the period of the cult of personality anyone who spoke out in favor of the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia was declared a nationalist and punished. The period of stagnation froze any kind of progressive movement in society and deprived the people of faith in justice for a long time.

After the 27th CPSU Congress when, under the leadership of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the party took a firm course toward restructuring all social life, democratization and glasnost, favorable conditions appeared for speaking openly, at the top of one's voice, about the most difficult problems which had been kept silent for decades, including the errors made in solving the national problem.

For the past nearly 4 months the Armenian people have unanimously called for correcting this historical error, determining the fate of Nagornyy Karabakh on the basis of Leninist positions, and reuniting it with Armenia.

[Question] Meetings and demonstrations are a new, a previously unparalleled phenomenon in our life. One can understand the confusion which such events have created. Nonetheless, as our readers write us, many complications and even tragic events could have perhaps been avoided had the population been given current and objective information and not swayed by emotions caused by rumors. For this a great deal of criticism was addressed at the mass information media.

[Answer] The criticism was entirely justified. It is very regrettable that both the central and local press did not prove themselves on the necessary level. For a long time the Soviet people actually received scant and distorted

information on events in Nagornyy Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Entirely in the spirit of the time of the cult of personality, the Karabakh events were described as the work of extremists, nationalists and.... foreign subversive centers.

A strange situation developed in the press. Even articles which misrepresented the history of the Autonomous Oblast could be freely published outside the republic, while the substantiated articles written by Armenian scientists, backed by scientific data, were refused by our newspapers and journals. The readers in the republic were amazed and disturbed. No one could explain why, by virtue of what circumstances, were perestroika and glasnost, proclaimed by the party, affected all aspects of life other than national policy and the gross errors committed in this area. It is characteristic that the majority of authors of articles published during those difficult and stormy months were journalists who had very little profound knowledge of historical problems. Historians, jurists and economists were not provided with a rostrum. It is no accident that during those 4 months not even an attempt was made in newspaper articles to look at the problem through the lens of the Leninist national policy, cleansed from the encrustations of the periods of the cult and stagnation.

[Question] The impression was created that the authors of some articles were not interested in seeking the truth and the restoration of justice. Conversely, they tried to make this most complex problem fit a primitive preset frame.

[Answer] What was particularly upsetting was that some articles totally contradicted the statements made by our party's Central Committee general secretary. In his Appeal to the Peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Mikhail Sergeyevich emphasized the following: "We do not favor any avoidance of the open discussion of different ideas and suggestions. However, this must be done calmly, within the framework of the democratic process and legality, without allowing even the slightest harm to be caused to the international unity among our peoples. The most serious problems of the people's fate must not be surrendered to uncontrolled elements and emotions." At its 9 March conference, the CPSU Central Committee noted that by decision of the Politburo, the Central Committee Secretariat was instructed to organize the profound and comprehensive study of the problems which had accumulated in the Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and the reasons for the aggravation of relations among nationalities around it, as well as to draft corresponding proposals and, as they are completed, to submit them for consideration by the CPSU Central Committee and the government of the USSR. This indicates that the problems of Nagornyy Karabakh are in the process of being studied and resolved. It is a good thing that of late the attitude of the mass information media toward problems of Nagornyy Karabakh has begun to change. It is becoming more serious and objective and we can sense the aspiration to understand the core of events. In this connection, let us note the series of

articles by Genrikh Borovik, broadcast in the "Position" program. Clearly, thanks to changes in the republic's party leadership, a radical change has been noted in our local press as well. In particular, Armenian scientists were given a rostrum for their statements. To this day, however, from time to time, in writing or verbally, we still come across statements which seem to be especially aimed at aggravating relations between nationalities and striking at the policy of perestroika. I am confident that the fate of the Karabakh problem is inseparably related to the fate of perestroika. A policy of democratization and glasnost cannot fail to apply to national policy as well, for the Soviet Union is a multinational state and to us the national problem is the very foundation of everything. The revolutionary tasks which were set by the 27th CPSU Congress cannot be implemented without the correction of errors in this area. Together with the entire Soviet people, the Armenian people actively support perestroika, considering it a guarantee for the fulfillment of their social and national expectations.

[Question] The criticism addressed to the press is justified. However, does it not seem to you that scientists as well are in debt to the people?

[Answer] I agree. So far few serious studies have been published in our country by historians, jurists, economists and other social scientists, which could help the leadership to gain an objective picture. I think that it would be useful to develop in the central scientific press a debate on this problem. Otherwise all kinds of distortions of the truth would become possible. Thus, in undertaking the study of the Karabakh problem, last autumn the CPSU Central Committee instructed the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History to provide pertinent information. The part dealing with the 1917-1923 period was drafted by G. Makarova, who hardly had any kind of profound knowledge of the problem. The result was a text which had nothing in common with science and historical truth. Such misunderstandings can be avoided only with the publication of serious works.

On the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, the republic's Academy of Sciences drafted a serious document which properly reflected the problem. The same type of document, as instructed by the rectorate, was drafted by specialists from the history department of Yerevan University. It would be useful for these and other serious works to be published in the Armenian and Russian languages. This is particularly important now, when a large number of documents are being circulated, written by nonprofessionals and which cannot withstand any scientific criticism.

[Question] Can you tell us a few words on the forms of manifestation by the people of their wishes and demands? All of this is new, as yet unstudied, and a great variety of assessments may be heard, some of which diametrically at variance with each other.

[Answer] In previous decades the forms of such manifestations were quite varied: individual and collective, letters, petitions, resolutions passed at meetings of collectives and party organizations, dissemination of historical documents, etc. Something new has appeared today: meetings and demonstrations. I am convinced that the February demonstrations attained their objective by drawing attention to the problem. The demonstrations are triggering in people who think in the old ways a sharply negative reaction. Generally speaking, however, demonstrations are a normal phenomenon in a democratic society. However, not only as a citizen but as a specialist in history, I believe that after M.S. Gorbachev's appeal and the 9 March resolution of the Politburo, the movement entered a new phase. The people have said their word. Now we need scientific substantiations of the formulated demands and calm and thoughtful work by specialists and the leadership. I am convinced that endless meetings, without specific slogans, are of no use, for everything has already been said. One should resort to such mass steps only in cases of extreme necessity and on an exceptional basis.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference lies ahead. It will greatly determine our further path and the fate of perestroika. A CPSU Central Committee Plenum on the national problem is being planned. We must learn how to wait, we must learn firmness and restraint.

These are difficult times, and passions are heated. We must not allow the Karabakh movement to deviate from the right path and to assume undesirable aspects. A mass of economic, social and moral problems have accumulated in the republic. They concern the people, which is natural. However, should all such problems be raised at meetings? They could be discussed under more tranquil and businesslike conditions, at meetings of collectives, in the press and on television and the radio. Elements are what they are, and where is the guarantee that such elements will not suddenly get out of control? I believe that in this case the role of our intelligentsia is particularly important, for it must give the right guidance to the people, the young in particular.

Latest News

[Question] This interview had already been signed to press at the time that the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet was holding a session at which, among others, it considered the resolution passed by the Soviet of People's Deputies of the Nagornyy-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of 20 February 1988. It was resolved to agree to the reunification of Nagornyy Karabakh with Armenia. A petition was submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet to ratify this resolution and the participants in the bloody crimes committed in Sumgait were severely condemned.

We also asked Lendrush Arshakovich Khurshudyan to share his impressions on the republic's Supreme Soviet session. Here is what he said:

[Answer] This resolution is of historical significance. For 70 years the Armenian people have struggled to repair a historical injustice and for the restoration of the truth. Today their expectations are becoming reality. The republic's Supreme Soviet passed a resolution which is entirely consistent with the national interests of the people. Naturally, the struggle does not end there and the question cannot be considered solved, for the final decision must be made by the USSR Supreme Soviet. We must do everything possible for the truth to triumph and for the Supreme Soviet to make a correct decision.

I do not share the view of people who have adopted a skeptical attitude toward this decision, having seen some shortcomings in it. I am confident that the resolution reflects all of our wishes and that those who drafted and discussed this document at the session took into consideration all fine points and aspects of the problem. Regardless of the solution which will be given to this problem in the future, the resolution of the session remains one of the most important documents in the history of the Armenian people. This could take place only under the conditions of developed perestroika, democratization and glasnost, proclaimed at the 27th CPSU Congress. Both the resolution and its discussion and their live television and radio broadcasting were a vivid confirmation of glasnost, which is asserting itself.

Despite all the difficulties which exist in the solution of this problem I am deeply convinced that the eventual fate of the problem will be related to that of perestroika itself and its victory.

05003

Armenian CP's Work During Crisis Scored; Staffer Urges Apparatus Changes
18300374a Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 26 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by Suren Alekseyevskiy, instructor at the Sovetskiy Raykom of the Armenian communist party in Yerevan: "I Want to Be a Political Worker and Not a Clerk!"]

[Text] The 19th Party Conference emphasized that each worker in the party apparatus should be primarily a political organizer, or, if you wish, a political fighter for the party who constantly carried out ideological and political work in the masses and in the people. Office or "inner sanctum" work should be a matter of the past if you wish to win the minds and hearts of the people.

In the republic things are still unquiet. Unfortunately, at various mass assemblies and meetings for a long time the voices of the party and soviet workers were not heard at all giving arguments against the arguments of the activists of the Karabakh Committee.

At this time, when the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has discussed before the entire nation the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh and has taken a constitutional

decision, it is not easy for our party workers to persuade the excited people that there could be no other decision. Our arguments still are not reaching the awareness of all. Emotions aroused by young people at the officially banned Karabakh Committee frequently gain the upper hand over reason. It is essential for us, it is essential without fail, to reach the people and have the people listen to our words and arguments and accept them.

The raykoms of the republic capital at present are reminiscent of firefighters. The secretaries and the workers of the apparatus are constantly in the organizations endeavoring to restrain the people and workers from rash action and even the flames of outright instigation which break out here and there drawing upon the strength of their authority and the force of persuasion. It is a good thing if they have such authority.

I would like to take up one instance which occurred several days ago at one of our enterprises. It was learned that its employees were preparing to halt production and go out into the streets. The raykom secretary and I as persons in charge immediately set off for the plant. People had assembled at the entrance and without going into the shops were urging those who were working to shut down the machines and join them. Initially there were around 50 people but persons were constantly coming out and the crowd was growing. We succeeded in persuading the people to meet in the auditorium. We spoke for a long time and workers and engineers also spoke. There were no previously prepared speeches and it was an open, frank exchange of opinions. I spoke with many of them although there were those who, knowing that I was a worker from the raykom, clearly turned their back on me. It was impossible to restrain them. The plant then shut down....

This is what I have on my mind.

The party is an organization where the highest principle of leadership is collectivism. What collective discussions of the urgent questions in the current state of affairs were organized over the entire spring or half of the summer? There were virtually none except those which occurred continuously in the meetings. In the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, in truth, there were meetings held where they discussed the questions related to normalizing the situation in the republic. At them, in particular, it was stated outrightly and sharply that in the current very difficult situation there had been alienation between the masses and the party organizations. This alienation had been artificially fanned by corrupt groups and antirestructuring forces. These forces were endeavoring to prevent the new leadership of the republic communist party from restoring a direct and honest contact with the people and which had been lost under the old leadership.

The Buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee, in fully supporting the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Nagornyy Karabakh, pointed out

that the situation which has arisen in recent months in the republic has been the result of major errors and mistakes in the political, organizational and ideological work of the party committees and the primary party organizations. They have shown a superficial approach to assessing the situation, they have not realized the political danger of unjustified appeals to revise the existing national territorial set-up in the region and have assumed a passive, wait-and-see position.

The party committees in an emergency situation were unable to lead the people with them and protect them from rash actions.

Samizdat has become widespread throughout the republic and these are the most diverse materials including letters, historical information, pamphlets, appeals and so forth. More than three volumes of them have already been collected. We have all read them, discussed them and argued but no one in the Central Committee or the Armenian CP gorkom has bothered to make even a cursory review to help the lecturers and propagandists. It would only be a surrealist who could comprehend that when a large meeting had assembled near Matenadaran, at the same time as this there was...a seminar for propagandists on the question of how to organize the last exercise in the political studies system. And there were more than a thousand of them there....

The workers of our apparatus instead of being in the organizations and on the spot, were engaged in preparing the schedules of the party meetings for which during May-June, for example, three agendas were put out. The dues had to be promptly collected, and information and critical comments voiced by the communists to improve work had to be sent out. The comments and proposals "for above" flowed with from 100 to 500 from each conducted meeting with a single agenda but there has been virtually no replies to them "from above" to the raykom.

Papers, papers.... While we may have other intentions, we are still caught. And it turns out that we do not work but merely "extricate" ourselves. It is an eternal running out of time. There is a rush only of isolated, divorced actions which are incapable of reaching the goal and at best merely defer things.

Myself and, I dare say, many of my comrades at work are profoundly and seriously concerned by the idea which has formed about the party apparatus as some bureaucratic conglomerate and nevertheless we constantly, without even wishing this, do everything to confirm precisely such a negative image.

During the years of stagnation many functions of the elected bodies were placed on the shoulders of the party apparatus and the impression appeared that the party work was managed not by the elected committee but rather the apparatus of this committee which was

directly subordinate to the superior committee. Certainly, precisely the apparatus planned the work, it prepared the plenums and the buros and determined the notorious "quality composition" of its party organization. The apparatus decided what should be and what should not be passed on to the superior body, what campaign should be carried out and how.

The experience of the last 3 years indicates that the party without any special costs can get rid of many bureaucratic layers which impede our progress. Glasnost and direct conversation with the people without the constraints of the feedback to the apparatus require a decisive revision of the entire system of managing social processes in our country.

All party power should be shifted into the hands of those who were elected by the communists to the elected party leadership body. The apparatus of the party committee is their assistant. But certainly we are still endeavoring to resolve the current difficult situation basically not drawing on the forces of the elected members of the party committee but rather by the workers of the apparatus, as before referring to the authority of the chairman's chair. But times have changed, people have changed and they prefer the authority of an individual capable of capturing the minds of people, of clearly explaining party policy, refraining from the fanning of emotions and suggesting the desired way out of the moral blind alley into which we have allowed ourselves to be driven over the long weeks and months of futile meetings and very unessential and harmful strikes.

It is essential to simplify the organizational structure of the party and make it more flexible. For example, is it advisable in the city of Leninakan to have a gorkom with two raykoms under it? Possibly the raykoms may not be necessary.

We should also provide a new interpretation for the principle of the unconditional bindingness of the decisions of a superior body for an inferior, and which was a source of Stalinism and which operates only in the apparatus down to the raykom but in the relations of the raykom and the primary organization more and more is a failure. I see the way to initiative, independence and creativity solely by revising this centralist anachronism which has been raised to an absolute.

In examining the problems of the apparatus from outside, I in no way want to say that the apparatus is not necessary. The first secretary of a raykom or gorkom needs an apparatus without fail and which can at the least hint understand what can be done and how in the actual situation and not function in a closed system. For this reason in selecting a new secretary, in the first place, it is essential to abandon the rigid nomenclature separation of functions within the apparatus so that the party leader himself can determine what formations he needs for carrying out the program he has outlined and, secondly, if the secretary has been changed, the former

apparatus should immediately retire after the elections. I realize that there is a contradiction here: the party has one program, one course and in principle the apparatus works to carry out this program. Moreover, what is to be done with this army of functionaries after each electoral campaign?

It will be hard at first. Even now there is serious resistance to any attempts to play down the rights of the apparatus. Nevertheless, I feel that this contradiction can to some degree be resolved if we finally recognize that the human factor exists also in the bureaucratic system and in selecting personnel for the apparatus we must be guided precisely by this and not the length of employment in a specialty or social origin. We do not need executors but rather organizers and professional political workers.

Strategy remains the same but tactics changes. And the changing of a secretary in principle also means a change in tactics. This is not a departure from the goals but is a search for new ways which foremost will lead to true authority of a party worker, the authority of a political leader who will listen to people and to whom they will turn, as today they do not turn to a clerk.

10272

**Progress of Ongoing State Investigation Into
Uzbek Corruption**
18300347 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 88 pp 3-4

[Article by Lt Col N. Belan, special correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Investigation Continues"]

[Text] It's summer again. Hot and bursting with fresh greenery.

"The so-called 'Bukhara Affair' began five years ago, in the summer of 1983," says A. Katusev, the deputy general procurator of the USSR. "Having taken a thousand-ruble bribe, the chief of the Bukhara Oblast OBKhSS got caught red-handed. A thousand rubles," Katusev repeats thoughtfully. "We thought that, having completed the case, that would be an end to it. But the chain extended further, leading to other cases concerning stolen millions."

A five-year "anniversary" is also a good reason to sum things up. But that's not the only reason we met with Katusev. The topic of conversation was the upcoming 19th All-Union Party Conference and the CPSU Central Committee's Theses for it, which includes discussion of the creation of a legal socialist state whose most fundamental feature is the supremacy and triumph of the law. What the investigative groups are doing in disentangling the cotton capers in Uzbekistan is one of the concrete

steps toward establishing that kind of supremacy and triumph of the law. That is the kind of legal, social thinking that can be discerned in their work.

"This is a million," said Vladimir Pavlovich Kravchenko, a member of the USSR Procuracy's investigative group, as he hefted one of the 14 sacks at his feet.

These sacks, stuffed with bundles of money, and half-full ones containing gold, big and little, were like the severed heads of a hydra whose name is corruption. Fourteen "heads" in a row. But how many more, perhaps even bigger than these, remain hidden? After all, as Katusev said, so far about one hundred million of the fabulous amounts of rubles stolen from the state by the cotton magnates of Uzbekistan have been returned. That's the amount of money, gold, and valuables that have been described and seized to date from those who felt themselves to be the emirs of our times. It's just a drop in the bucket. Colossal work still lies ahead!

Maybe that's why Kravchenko's statement "this is one million" made no special impression? Could it be that it was perceived as something abstract? Try to guess, without looking, the content of these sacks. What I saw were heaps of gold coins from the tsar's mint, piles of rings, and hundred-ruble notes in bank wrappings, but nothing stirred in my soul except a feeling of revulsion. I thought, "Maybe I'm slyly lying to myself?" I looked around, gazed into the faces of the people witnessing this exhibit. They averted their gaze, squeamishly. Having seen the traces of a crime, what else can a man feel?

I looked at the sacks which Kravchenko showed us and could not get rid of the feeling that behind them lies something familiar, something which has been thought about many times but for which no answer has been found. Then I remembered: it was in the Trans-Baykal region. N. Kuzakov, the writer from Chita, recounted a trip home to a remote Evenki village, located on the banks of the River Nepa, a tributary of the Lower Tunguska.

"Hunters told me that the bedsheets have disappeared from the stores. That's bad but tolerable," he added. "Cotton clothing and underclothes are nowhere to be had; that's worse. In the taiga, synthetic fabrics aren't warm enough. It's also a bad thing that gunpowder is in short supply; how is a man of the taiga to feed himself without it?"

He was silent for a while and then, not without bitter irony, he asked:

"And how is it with you guys in the army? Any sign of the 'unstoppable growth' of cotton harvest yields? You got enough ammunition?"

He is the son of a long line of hunters, and that is the way he sees the problem of disruptions in the availability of gunpowder.

Incidentally, all of us would like to have bedclothes and clothing made of light cotton fabrics, but if they are available they mostly come from abroad. What we have got instead are victorious reports about new successes achieved under the leadership of Rashidov, or lists of new Heroes of Labor, who according to the indicators have piled the country high with cotton. What's going on? We have sought the answers and failed to find them.

And here I was gazing upon millions of rubles got for exaggerated millions of tons of cotton. Dead millions dug up out of the ground. Like the dead roots of a mighty tree which could have borne fruit. This is more than simple plunder. It is a blow to the economy and to the moral health of our society, of the whole people, their love for whom the cotton magnates pledged so often from their high rostrums. In reality? A. Patan, a member of the investigative group, told me that he observed the following picture many times. Black fields, cleared away by autumn, would suddenly be filled with schoolchildren and college students. For a month or more at a time, at the expense of their studies, they would play at harvesting the cotton. The same cotton that had to be delivered to the oblast or the rayon on Rashidov's orders. Economic crimes gave rise to another kind—crimes against our ideals, against these children's attitudes toward labor as they were starting out in life. The material damage inflicted by the Rashidov era has been computed. But how do we compute the moral damage?

Spiritual values have been trampled into the mud. The people have been robbed of the gold of our ideological principles, our sacred things, faith in social justice. The venality of party, soviet, and economic officials. The venality of workers of the MVD, trade, health care, public education....And consider this fact. The notorious Adilov, for example, used to interrogate "guilty" or merely "suspicious" people right in front of innocent folks, pouring ice water down their necks in the winter.

How about attitudes toward state awards?

"The more the orders cost the more they are devalued in the eyes of the people," says Katusev. "The only ones the people view with respect are the boys who fought in Afghanistan, front-line soldiers. And not everywhere at that."

Corruption has simply flourished. I asked one of the possessors of the million-ruble treasures, confiscated by the investigative group, what he needed it for.

"To keep afloat," he answered.

But what meaning does he put into those words?

"To keep afloat" requires giving bribes. First, to buy a job; then for protection and connivance. For honors and awards. Payment was assessed even when the boss went on leave: his subordinates each gave what he could afford (in accordance with the job he held, of course), for

travel and vacation expenses. And there was an unwritten rule as to what denominations should be paid to whom. One person might be paid in 25-ruble notes, no less. Another might be paid in 50-ruble notes. Still another would get only 100-ruble notes. And they must all be crisp and new. In bundles with bank wrappings. Otherwise they would shove your offering right back in your face.

"To keep afloat" requires consoling oneself with the thought of all those thousands and millions of rubles hidden away. For what? This is probably the only question to which I failed to find an answer.

"This mentality is simply unfathomable," said V. Muzalevskiy, a member of the investigative group. "I asked one of the millionaires how he accumulated that kind of money, and for what. 'It just turned out that way', he answered. 'I took bribes and socked the money away in secret places. Once, having nothing better to do, I counted it up: 500,000. Well now, I thought, I'll go to a million and that will be it. Soon the cherished million was lying on my desk. But the excitement didn't pass. I decided to go a second round and that would be it.'"

Vitaliy Nikolayevich Muzalevskiy chuckled:

"He failed; we stepped in. Go figure a man's psychology. Of course, an explanation can be found—greed, for example. But sometimes we find secret caches and bring out bundles of money that have been eaten by mice. And once we seized a trunk full of hundred-ruble notes that had decayed. You touched them and they fell apart."

Andrey Mikhailovich Patan added a few strokes to this picture.

"One of our 'proteges' was found to have, in addition to valuables, a buried trunk in which 140 suits were stored. I asked him why so many, wouldn't they rot in the ground? 'No', he answered, 'I air them out regularly'. But in five years, I told him, they would go out of fashion. And he says, 'Let them. At least I have them'. Or take another example. One millionaire buried money and valuables in front of his house, covered them with concrete slabs, and enjoyed the fact that every evening he could sit there, smoke, and contemplate how rich he was."

One explanation is that in the atmosphere of stagnation, many people degenerated. Degenerated. Probably it is futile to ask ourselves, Why these millions, why these 140 suits. We have to dig down to the question of what gives rise to conditions in which communist leaders and rank-and-file communists undergo degeneration? After all, the members of the investigative group were not dealing with some ignorant, downtrodden persons dredged up from the Middle Ages: these were former party and economic officials.

Along with Kravchenko, for example, I accompanied one of them onto the airliner. He was a former raykom first secretary. From him and another party official (I will not name them while the investigation is in progress) the authorities seized money and gold amounting to eight million rubles. What did he talk about on the flight to Moscow, where his case was to be investigated further? He said that while he was first secretary he never once visited the isolation cell, otherwise he would have seen that the place needed repairs and he would not have suffered discomfort later.

A great deal has been written in the Central press about the scale of the corruption and the intensity of the five years of work being done by the USSR Procuracy's investigative groups (there are about 20 operating in Uzbekistan right now). The facts that have been adduced above are just additional details. I was not so much interested in new crime plots, which life serves up every day, or the course of the investigation. Much more important are the generalizations, interpretations, conclusions. For the first stage of the work is already over.

Consider, for example, the question of state awards. Why shouldn't the orders and medals which Rashidov was wrongly awarded be returned? The same as, for example, still prospering comrades, who received them, it is now clear, for padded figures and inflated labor successes. Many of the people I had occasion to talk to think that a decision should be taken on this matter by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for the sake of the triumph of justice.

At the center of attention of the investigation today is a whole spectrum of political, economic, social, ideological, and moral problems that have arisen in the course of the investigation.

"For example," I was told, "they started at the bottom in bringing people to book in regard to the 'cotton' capers; then they went to the executives and the minister and said: 'Here is the wrongdoing, and this is who did it.' But none of those high-placed comrades asked who gave his blessing to the wrongdoing. No one had the good conscience to repent and defend the thousands of ordinary workers, 'little guys', who got caught up in the capers. At first we saw a flurry of reports: convict as many as possible in order to demonstrate one's 'implacability' in the struggle against shortcomings, but the main figures in the former 'game' remained in the shadows. They had the necessary forces in the republic's law enforcement organs. But the investigators did not knuckle under to these forces, concentrating their blow against the main organizers of the system of corruption. It is a matter of principle."

In the Central Committee's Political Report at the 27th CPSU Congress, M. S. Gorbachev noted that the shortcomings in Uzbekistan did not appear all at once; they

were building for years, growing from small to large. Officials of all-union organs went to the republic more than once, and they could hardly fail to notice what was going on.

Yes, there were lots of investigative commissions from a variety of departments. How could they fail to see what was lying right on the surface, so to speak? I think that the reasons for this "failure to see," and the specific guilty parties, should also be determined by an investigation and that a just decision should be taken.

Recently, officials of the investigative group met with one of Uzbekistan's old bolsheviks. This veteran is deeply convinced that a party commission should be created to analyze what has happened. The "repressive" route alone will not yield the desired results; it will merely constitute retribution for acts that have been committed. The roots must be pulled out lest the thistle spring up again. One cannot but agree with the old bolshevik's thinking. The investigators are wholeheartedly in favor of such actions, appealing to the people to come to them. "We need glasnost, we are not in favor of an 'underground' system of investigation. Let there be dual monitoring of the investigative group: party control and the supervision of the General Procurator. This can only benefit the cause, it's the democratic way."

"The bribe-takers could set out their bastions against anything, against our ideological and moral positions," said the members of the investigative group. "They have no ideals, they structure everything on a mercenary basis. Our adversaries understand this and, through social demagoguery, they are trying to regain their lost positions. They are attempting, for example, to tarnish our struggle against corruption with a national tinge. They might say, for example, 'stop terrorizing the Uzbek people.' But what does Uzbek have to do with it? Others besides Uzbeks live in the republic. And it's not Uzbeks, Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, or Tadjiks who are being convicted...It's thieves."

"The findings of the investigation have fully confirmed the assessments and conclusions made at the 27th party congress," says Aleksandr Filippovich Katusev. "Everything we have encountered while investigating the cotton capers in Uzbekistan are the fruits of the lack of criticism and self-criticism. The former leaders of the republic made it a rule to speak only of their achievements, to keep silent about shortcomings, and any criticism evoked a nervous reaction. This is the source of the flourishing of bootlicking, unconstrained eulogies to 'those senior in rank'; unprincipledness, personal prosperity, and careerist considerations took the upper hand, while machinations, thefts, and bribe-taking became widespread. Let me emphasize that the party discussed this directly and honestly at the congress, and questions of strengthening socialist legality are also to be dealt with at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. I think this must be kept firmly in mind when speaking about the

investigation in Uzbekistan, in order to understand correctly what is going on, in order not to pursue cheap sensationalism and not give grounds for distorted interpretations."

Next morning the airplane which had landed at the airport in Urgench (a small town near Tashkent) was loaded with sacks full of money and valuables, the same ones that Kravchenko had showed us. This unusual cargo was to be flown to Moscow by an aircraft crew headed by Lt Col V. Lopatin and an escort consisting of a unit of internal troops under the command of Maj Yu. Nenakhov.

"All honest people are helping us, and not just in this republic," said Katusev later. "Military personnel are also willing to help when we ask them. For example, they assigned us a helicopter and about 30 interpreters—soldiers and non-commissioned officers who are natives of this wonderful land. Military jurists are also helping the investigative group."

Aleksandr Filippovich went on to say, "I don't want to give the impression that only the investigative group is involved in this matter. We are also getting considerable help from the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, militia officers, and the KGB. We enjoy the constant support of the CPSU Central Committee. Without this help and support we would undoubtedly have managed to do a great deal less than we have now."

I watched them load the sacks and could not help thinking that the investigative group is not merely returning gold to the country and the people—it is returning moral values, faith in truth and justice, faith in socialist legality.

06854

KaSSR: Growing Environmental Problems Face Lake Balkhash

Scientist on Lake Desiccation

18300337 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 May 88 p 3

[Article by senior scientist of the Institute of geology at the KaSSR Academy of Sciences, A. Shlygin, under the rubric: "Balkhash Must Live": "To Act Fast and Decisively"]

[Text] Last summer Kazakh TV conducted a discussion concerning the problems of Lake Balkhash. The discussion was very emotionally charged. During the discussion different and sometimes contradictory statements were made. However in our opinion, the situation was not assessed realistically enough and the proposed measures were reduced to suggestions of activating the work of developing scientific recommendations by the Institute of geography at the KaSSR Academy of Sciences.

Unfortunately, the results of the TV discussion were not discussed in the periodic press. Meanwhile, the situation is so serious and alarming that fast and energetic decisions at the highest, most obviously, Party-Government level are required.

The main problem is the lowering of the water level in Lake Balkhash; namely, it is drying. All other ecological effects (reduction of the fish and muskrat population, etc.) are important, of course, but they are determined by the lake drying out and, obviously, to discuss them without solving the main problem does not make sense.

The water basin of Lake Balkhash is a closed system. The surface and ground waters of the basin are fed, in the final analysis, only by atmospheric precipitations in the areas of Dzhungarskiy and Zailiyskiy Alatau, and partially, of Kungey-Alatau and Terskey-Alatau, Kendyktas, Chilliyskiy mountains, and valleys between mountains. Under natural conditions water loss occurred through evaporation from Lake Balkhash, rivers, small lakes, swamps, tapering of ground water, and evaporation from the soil surface. Stability of the lake's level was a result of the balance between atmospheric precipitations and evaporation losses. Water in rivers and creeks that was "lost in sands" was actually filtering through into aquifers and, finally, was either directly evaporated, or was tapering into the Ili River, other rivers, and directly into Lake Balkhash to sustain its level.

The situation had essentially changed when in order to widen irrigated areas and to improve water supply of fast growing cities, including Alma-Ata, numerous concrete-lined large and small water reservoirs, irrigation canals, and large capacity underground water storage facilities were built. In addition to water resources that were previously lost from evaporation from the interior parts of the basin, those which were feeding Lake Balkhash were also affected. The water balance of the lake was sharply disturbed and the drop of the lake's level reached significant proportions. The lake started to dry out rapidly and the danger of a sharp reduction of its surface became eminent with the small depth of the lake contributing to this process.

It is absolutely clear that only a sharp change in climate conditions can stop naturally the process of the lake's water level drop, but one cannot expect this to happen. To increase the water supply of the lake to a rate which would exceed the natural one in the past in order to replenish the lost water is impossible regardless of the methods to be used. Therefore, all talks about restoring the previous water level in the lake, at least during the observable historic future, are unrealistic. Even more, soon it will be impossible to stop a further drop in the water level in Lake Balkhash. It seems that it is not enough to carry out the proposed liquidation of the Kapchagayskiy water reservoir and some rice fields to prevent this further drop. It will be necessary, additionally, to liquidate many other smaller-size reservoirs, including the Bartogayskiy reservoir and BAK, large irrigated areas of the Panfilovskiy and Karadaliinskij types, and to reduce sharply water consumption by

Alma-Ata and Taldy-Kurgan, because all of them use water which in the past was feeding Lake Balkhash. It is obvious that to realize these measures is practically impossible. Therefore, now we can only discuss how to reduce the rate of water level drop in Lake Balkhash until a new equilibrium is reached and measures to be taken by the national economy based on the existing situation.

We must clearly understand that the main cause of the existing state of Lake Balkhash is the imbalanced consumption of water resources across its whole basin and in all regions. Lack of one authority over water resources, both surface and ground water, and uncontrolled use of water by different organizations without taking into account the available capacity of the basin, are responsible for this situation in the first place.

The existing conditions cause alarm not only because certain unfavorable processes became evident, but also because they may develop further and lead to dangerous consequences. For example, there is no assurance that it will not be necessary to change water supply systems in the town of Balkhash and the Balkhashskiy combine, whether there will be enough water for the Yuzhno-Balkhashkaya GRES, etc.

No partial measures, such as periodical water dumping from the Kapchagayskiy reservoir or some reduction of irrigated area, will solve the problem. We must actively solve the problem of water supplies of the whole basin altogether. We need to take urgent, concrete measures, including organizational ones, rather than develop scientific recommendations only. The problem studies by academic commissions will not essentially change the existing situation because these commissions lack authority and technical means. Concentration of efforts by various organizations and decisive measures directed toward resolving the whole problem of using water resources of the Lake Balkhash basin are necessary.

Even after a brief analysis, the problem of the lake manifests itself as one of State importance affecting the fundamental interests of Kazakhstan. Two most important sides of the solution of the problem being discussed became evident. Firstly, all water resources, both surface and ground, must have one authority having the rights not only to count water, but also distribute it among consumers, limit water consumption, and determine the possibility of water consumption expansion. Obviously, the KaSSR Ministry of irrigation and water management may become such an authority responsible for all water resources of Kazakhstan (fresh and salt water lakes, rivers, glaciers, and ground water). Secondly, the water balance of the basin must become the basis for planning consumption of the water resources. The existing knowledge of both the surface and ground water allows us to accurately determine the water resources and their distribution throughout the region. If such a balance does not exist, it can be calculated within the shortest time based on the existing data of the KaSSR Ministries of water management and geology, KaSSR

Academy of Science institutes, State Committee for hydro-meteorology, and other organizations. Even more, the level of our knowledge allows us to prognosticate the water resources changes with time. The existing methods of computer-assisted computations of the water balance allow us to determine fast and quite accurately the amounts of water that we can use, and where and what changes in the levels of rivers, lakes, and ground waters will occur following men's interference with the natural processes.

Thus, we must admit that Lake Balkhash is drying, and it will be impossible to restore its original water level. Even more, the further drop of the water level of the lake is eminent. Such a situation leads to the conclusion that the two following measures are necessary to be carried out. Firstly, it is necessary to create a modern system of water resources management based on the water balance of the whole water basin, and strictly limit the consumption of all surface and ground water in all agricultural and industrial rayons (including Alma-Atinskiy, Taldy-Kurganskiy, and others). Water consumption limits for all without exceptions consumers (cities, townships, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and industrial enterprises) must be established.

Secondly, water evaporation losses from the natural reservoirs and swampy areas, from man-made structures, and during irrigation must be reduced. At the same time, in order to reduce the evaporation surface area, one should not preclude the possibility of the construction of a dam on Lake Balkhash near Uzun-Aral.

Unfortunately, during the TV discussion the issues of whether the water balance of Lake Balkhash basin is determined or not, what the outlook to be made based on this balance is, and what kind of phenomena we may expect in the nearest future, remained unanswered. The position of the KaSSR Ministry of irrigation and water management remained unclear.

Although the fast and energetic measures directed toward water consumption management and reduction of evaporation losses within the boundaries of the whole water basin at any distance from the lake together with organizational measures would not restore the past status of the lake, they would help to stabilize in the shortest time the water level of Lake Balkhash and thus would reduce the negative results of the process.

Official Actions, Responses Assailed

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[Letter on behalf of 105 participants of the general meeting of war and labor veterans of the mining and metallurgical combine signed by the chairman of the veteran's council at the Balkhashskiy mining and metallurgical combine, the USSR Council of Ministers Award laureate, I. Bredyuk; Hero of Socialist labor, Zh. Beisov; KaSSR Honored innovator, M. Gorodetskiy; and the USSR Council of Ministers Award laureate, KaSSR Honored power engineer, Ya. Pessin under the rubric: "Balkhash Must Live": "People with a Scalpel"]

[Text] We are reading with great attention the materials concerning the problems of Lake Balkhash in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA. It seems, the time has come to express our point of view on the subject.

The present situation with the lake is not unexpected. It was consciously condemned to extinction for overestimated economic benefits, for a beach near Alma-Ata with a resort area for the chosen, and for the selfish interests of the authors and substantiators of the Kapchagayskiy complex project.

Since the start of the project all consequences of its realization were well known. For example, the transactions of the KaSSR branch of the Institute for Hydrological Projects clearly stated that the construction of the proposed hydroelectric plant and irrigation systems would lead to the lake's water level drop to such a degree that the lake will practically disappear. In the resolution of the State expert commission at the USSR Gosplan of 24 Apr 65 it is stated that "When in the future all measures directed toward utilization of the water resources will be realized, a further drop of the lake's water level will take place and in the long run, it will completely disappear."

There were also other similar warnings. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, KaSSR Ministry of non-ferrous metallurgy, Balkhash gorispolkom, personnel of the Kazakh authority for protection and usage of water resources, and many other organizations tried to protect the lake. However, their opinion was disregarded.

It would seem that today radical measures for the saving of Lake Balkhash should be taken. However, what do we see after official responses to the newspaper's articles were received?

The KaSSR Academy of Sciences responses (KAZAKH-STANSKAYA PRAVDA of 19 and 26 Apr 87) state that "The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences shares the concerns of the authors of the open letter 'Balkhash Must Live' for the fate of the unique natural reservoir, namely, Lake Balkhash." One impression after reading is that the Academy learned about the lake's fate only from the open letter. And it does not have a single word about the role of organizations of the Academy and those guilty in this terrible deed. And it is exactly the Academy that is one of the most guilty parties in what has happened. Its conclusions were the determining factors in the decision making concerning the construction of the Kapchagayskiy complex which is causing substantial harm to the lake.

In order to prevent denials, we quote from the book written by the former director of the Institute of power engineering, Sh. Chokin, who was the President of the KaSSR Academy of Sciences during those years. This is what he wrote: "The reservoir is being filled up. . . This event makes happy and excites the collective of the KaSSR Institute of power engineering, and especially the author of this work, because his idea and his technical arrangement were realized, and he can see the results of his more than 10-year long work".

In the same book the author advises that the design work was carried out by the Institute of power engineering together with other institutes of the Academy, namely, of soil science, botany, geology, and economics. The author of the book does not conceal that as the result of the project realization the water level of Lake Balkhash will drop to the 339 mark which is equivalent to transforming the lake into separate swamps. It seems that everything is clear. But why then is there not in the response a single word about the responsibility of its institutes for the sad fate of the lake and about their own unspoken data concerning the construction of the Kapchagayskiy hydroelectric plant?

To recognize one's errors is not an end in itself. However, it is impossible to make correct decisions without the complete understanding of these errors. Fear of openness and the desire to cover up the role of its own "transformers of nature," it seems, had predetermined the position of the Presidium with regard to both the present condition of the lake and its future fate. It may be the reason why the response to the newspaper did not even mention the task of restoring the lake.

The response discusses only the need to keep the lake at the presently existing level mark. It follows that the Presidium of the Academy "forgives" the destruction of one-third of the lake. Should not the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the lakes Baikal and Ladoga, where those directly guilty for the harm that has been done were named and their responsibility was defined, serve as the examples for resolving similar cases? The decisions require the complete restoration of these lakes in spite of the huge material costs. Why then is the Academy of our republic not following this example of the real care for protecting the natural resources of the country?

The measures proposed by the Presidium concerning Lake Balkhash are lacking concrete actions. Up to this time the practicality of their realization, economic feasibility, and the expected effect have not been determined.

The response of the deputy Chairman of the KaSSR Council of Ministers, E.Kh. Gukasov (KAZAKH-STANSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 May 87) leaves a no less strange impression. It would seem that the newspaper and its readers should expect a clear answer to the criticism, and to why and whose fault it is that the lake must be saved from complete annihilation. However, we could not find a single word of condemnation for the harm that has been done and of criticism addressing the responsible persons for the huge harm inflicted upon the nature and national economy.

The issue of restoring the crippled lake is not mentioned. Instead, it advises in details of the measures taken by the republic in order to stabilize the water management situation in the Ili-Balkhash basin, and that in the future the water level in the reservoir will be kept at the level

which would guarantee a normal operation of all water supply systems, which corresponds to the water volume in the Kapchagayskiy reservoir of 13.5 cubic meters. But what does it matter for the saving of the lake? This volume was kept in the reservoir during the recent years but the water level in the lake continued to drop.

In other words, there are no concrete proposals. And again, as in the response of the Presidium of the Academy, the actual measures for saving the lake are promised after the scientific-research work is complete. How many studies must be performed? This work has been carried out already 20-25 years ago and has produced no results.

We completely do not understand the position of the KaSSR Ministry of water management and its project institutes which do not want to explain their project errors during the design and construction of the Kapchagayskiy complex to publish their outlook on the lake's situation and their position and intents concerning the correction of the errors that have been made. Time is running out. Data exist that after 2-3 years the process of the lake's disappearance may become irreversible. Urgent, radical measures are necessary.

At the present time, we are already being intimidated by the possibility of controlling the Ili river flow outside the territory of Kazakhstan. The authors of the dam are saying: Look what you have achieved with your glasnost; we knew that it would happen, and therefore, were designing a dam to save Balkhash. This is some turn in the case indeed! Those who were destroying the lake may pass as its saviors. Is not this the reason for all possible and impossible delays and for the lack of desire to discuss publicly the problems of the lake? This is the result of a policy of half-measures.

We understand that to solve all problems simultaneously is very difficult. And not only in the technical sense is that so. We should take into account the human factor too. There are still many active high officials involved in the crippling of the lake, and one cannot expect any active actions for its saving. However, it is in the interests of the republic and the whole country that the Government's decisions taking into account public demands must be fulfilled. The lake must be preserved. And not in its present crippled shape, but as it was before the "transformers of nature" interfered.

And the last thing to consider. We do not understand why during the decision-making process concerning the lake's fate, the organizations having vital interest in this matter, namely, Party and civic organizations of the town of Balkhash, its main enterprise, the Balkhashskiy mining and metallurgical combine, and other enterprises depending on the existence of the lake, are not called upon.

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Impact of Stalinism in Kirghizia Highlighted

18330408 [Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETTIK KYRGYSZTAN in Kirghiz 26 June 1988 carries on page 3 a 3100-word article by Shabdabay Abdyramanov headlined "Why is Restructuring Necessary?" on the impact of Stalinism on Kirghiz society and the need to introduce democratization and "Leninist concepts of socialist pluralism." Pointing out that during and after the Stalin period "Leninist principles were violated in the selection of party cadres," he adds that during that time cadres were selected according to "localism, tribalism, nepotism or toadyism." In intellectual life no free discussion was permitted on various aspects of the unification of Kirghizia with the Russian Empire. He claims that objective decisions of this and other questions of the Kirghiz past were often met with accusations that such writings were "anti-Russian," 'anti-socialist' or 'anti-Soviet.'" Numerous examples of repressions in Kirghiz life are recounted.